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ABSTRACT 
German company law is said to offer small and medium-sized businesses that 
strive for limited liability a burdensome and inflexible business form: the 
Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (GmbH). Critics point to the success of the 
US Limited Liability Company (LLC), which combines corporate-like limited 
liability protection and the tax treatment and flexible entity-governance of a 
partnership. This paper argues that an LLC-like business form is urgently needed in 
Germany. 
First, the historical roots of the US LLC will be illustrated as well as the role 
of the new entity in the context of US and German company law. The focal point of 
the paper is a comparative analysis of GmbH and LLC. This will include a discussion 
of powers, liability, taxation, formation procedures, management and member issues, 
and a detailed analysis of capital requirements revealing that the LLC offers a far 
more convenient regime for small and medium-sized businesses. 
Consequently, this paper concludes that an LLC-like business f01m should be 
available to German businesses. As reforms at the European level would take too 
long to be realised, a new company form needs to be implemented in Germany. 
STATEMENT ON WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper - excluding table of contents, abstract, footnotes , 
bibliography and appendices - comprises approximately 12,478 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung (GmbH) has turned out to be the 
preferred business form for small and medium-sized firms in Germany that strive for 
limited liability. However, the GmbH burdens small and medium businesses with a 
variety of regulatory requirements, which inevitably cause them to incur substantial 
costs in carrying out their normal business activities. 
A Recent Developments In Company Law 
Some scholars have already pointed to the success of the Limited Liability 
Company (LLC) in the US as a role model for German reform. 1 The idea of coupling 
limited liability protection with preferential tax treatment and flexible entity 
governance compelled States in the US to enact new legislation leading to 
fundamental changes in company law. The LLC emerged as a new business form 
combining the best of both worlds, meaning the advantages of a corporation 
(limited liability) and the advantages of a partnership (taxation, flexibility). 
In addition to creating the LLC as a completely new business form, US States 
have also modified traditional partnerships by mutating them to Limited Liability 
Partnerships (LLPs). Once registered as an LLP, limited liability protection is 
granted to owners that have historically faced unlimited liability. Only recently, the 
UK followed the US lead and enacted the Limited Liability Partnerships Act.2 
1 Joseph A McCahery and Eric PM Vermeulen "Unincorporated Business Entities: The Evolution of 
Closely Held Business Forms in Europe" (2001) 26 lowa J Corp L 855; Stephen L Wright and Eva M 
Holland "New: Wege im Gesellschaftsrecht der USA; D·e Limited Liability - Company (LLC) am 
Beispiel des Bundesstaates Georgia" (1996) 1996 NJW 95. 
2 The Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 (UK) is available online at 
http: //www. legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000012.htm (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
Although in its origins the UK LLP is similar to the US LLP, the actual legal form rather resembles 
the US LLC: Judith Freedman "Limited Liability Partnerships in the United Kingdom - Do They Have 
a Role for Small Firms?" (2001) 26 Iowa J Corp L 897, 899; Matthias Kilian "Die limited liability 
partnership - Eine neue Gesellschaftsform im britischen Recht" (2000) 2000 NZG 1008, fn 18. 
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These developments in the US and the UK eliminated the traditional choice 
that businesses had to make between limited liability and the tax treatment of a 
partnership. As a Delaware court stated: "Long gone are the days when business 
planners were confined to corporate and partnership structures."3 
Measured by popular acceptance, all these reform efforts have been extremely 
successful.4 Practitioners are using the new business forms without any apparent 
hesitation. The reforms have similarly found great support in legal scholarship. 
Both the LLC and LLP are widely regarded as the product of a selective process, in 
which new business forms are created and traditional forms are modified as part of a 
movement towards wider availability of limited liability. It is maintained that 
competition between legal jurisdictions has led to a "race to the top" in the 
production of efficient business forms. 5 However, this view is not unchallenged. 
In opposition to the prevailing opinion in academia, some legal scholars argue that 
interfusing corporate and partnership law principles does not create new coherent 
entities but business forms burdened with many disadvantages. Consequently, the 
new business forms might result from a "race to the bottom".6 
B Reform Need In German Company Law 
The evaluation of the aforementioned reforms leads back to the starting point, 
the burdensome complexity of German company law. Large companies have the 
resources to cope with inconvenient statutory provisions. However, for small and 
medium-sized enterprises it is of the utmost importance that German law provides 
the GmbH as a highly developed business form, but at present limited liability is 
cumbersome and expensive to achieve. Therefore, creating a new simplified regime 
could satisfy the needs of a range of small and medium-sized firms and also lead to 
an increase in the number of start-up firms. 
3 The cited phrase can be found in the obiter dicta of ELF Atochem North America, Inc v Jaffari and 
Malek LLC (1999) 727 A2d 286, 290 (Del). In this case, a member had brought a derivative suit 
against an LLC and its manager, alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty. However, the suit was 
disro.(ssed for l11ck of subject atter j\1risdiction. 
4 Charles W Murdock "Limited Liability Companies in the Decade of the 1990s: Legislative and Case 
Law Developments and Their Implications for the Future" (2001) 56 Bus Law 499; Joseph A 
McCahery and Eric P M Vermeulen "Unincorporated Business Entities: The Evolution of Closely 
Held Business Forms in Europe" (200 I) 26 Iowa J Corp L 855, 856. 
5 Joseph A McCahery and Eric PM Vermeulen "Unincorporated Business Entities: The Evolution of 
Closely Held Business Forms in Europe" (2001) 26 Iowa J Corp L 855, 856. 
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The emerging question is whether Germany should follow the US and UK 
lead and implement a new business form, thus extending the menu of available 
business forms. This research paper focuses on the US LLC as a possible role model. 
Nevertheless, where appropriate the US LLP as well as the UK LLP will be 
considered. As far as the US LLC is concerned, this paper will mainly deal with the 
state legislation in Wyoming. As far as case law is concerned, other LLC statutes and 
the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULCCA) will also be considered. 
The paper briefly outlines the history of LLC legislation in the US (II). 
The LLC will then be distinguished from other US business forms in order to 
categorise this new company form (III). Next, German law is introduced by asking 
whether there is a German business form that resembles the US LLC (IV). As there 
is no business form completely identical, it will be discussed whether Germany 
should adopt the US approach. Here, a comparison is drawn between the US LLC 
and the most appropriate German counterpart, the GmbH (V). This comparison will 
point out similarities and differences with regard to powers, liability, taxation, 
formation, and capital requirements. Furthermore, management- and member-related 
issues come up for discussion. Finally, this paper concludes that a new business form 
in Germany is urgently needed. This conclusion is based upon the aforementioned 
comparison, which proves that the LLC provides a far more flexible and convenient 
business form for small and medium-sized businesses (VI). 
6 Allan Vestal and William Callison ,,They 've Created a Lamb with Mandibles of Death: Secrecy, 
Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability Firms" (2001) 76 Ind L J 271,274. 
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II HISTORY OF LLC LEGISLATION IN THE US 
The term "limited liability company" first appeared in a US Supreme Court 
decision in 1891.7 While today's LLC may not be the same business entity as the 
limited liability company described in this decision, the concept of limited liability 
remains the same. Nevertheless, the advantage of limited liability protection was 
soon depreciated by disadvantages in tax law as the Revenue Act 19138 started to tax 
the income of corporations, but not the income of partnerships. The system of double 
taxation for corporations introduced by this Act can be seen as one of the dominant 
factors for the emergence of the LLC more than 60 years later. 
Regarding today's LLC, everything started with Hamilton Brothers Oil. 
This Denver-based but internationally operating company mainly used the 
Panamanian Limitada for its business activities. The Panamanian Limitada offered 
limited liability and partnership classification for US income tax purposes. However, 
it had the disadvantage of a complex administrative structure. Furthermore, it was 
not ensured that US courts would acknowledge the liability protection.9 On account 
thereof, the legal advisers of Hamilton Brothers Oi I invented the concept of the LLC 
and first presented it to the Alaska legislature in 1975. After Alaska refused to 
implement new legislation, Hamilton Brothers Oil approached Wyoming. Here the 
lobbying was successful. 10 In 1977, Wyoming enacted the new concept, thus 
becoming the first state in the US providing the LLC form. 11 
Florida followed in 1982, 12 but the LLC did not attract much attention, as the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) first was reluctant to acknowledge partnership status. 
For the IRS, limited liability seemed to be inevitably bound to the classification as a 
corporation. Eventually in 1988, the IRS issued a ruling stating that limited liability 
7 Case Manufacturing Co v Saxman ( 1891) 138 US 431 , 435. Here, the US Supreme Court upheld the 
statutory liability limitations of a Permsylvanian entity known as Latrobe Milling Company, Ltd. 
8 For details regarding the Revenue Act 1913, see Susan Pace Hamill "The Origins Behind the 
Limited Liability Company" (1998) 59 Ohio St LJ 1459, 1501 , 1502. 
9 Very detailed on the Latin Limitada, Susan Pace Hamill "The Origins Behind the Limited Liability 
Company" (1998) 59 Ohio St LJ 1459, 1464. 
10 For more details see Warren H Johnson, "Limited Liability Companies (LLC): Is the LLC Liability 
Shield Holding Up Under Judicial Scrutiny?" (2000) 35 ew Eng L Rev 177, F 50. 
11 Wyoming Limited Liability Act, eh 158, 1977; codified at Wyo Stat Ann, ss 17-15-101 to -143. 
12 Florida Limited Liability Company Act, eh 82, 1982; codified at Fla Stat Ann, ss 608.401-.471. 
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protection by itself would not lead to corporate taxation. 13 The IRS referred to the 
four corporate characteristics as mentioned by the US Supreme Court in the 
Morissey Case, 14 these being continuity of life, centralised management, free 
transferability of interests, and limited liability. The IRS pointed out that each of the 
four characteristics had equal weight. Consequently, the absence of at least two of 
the four corporate attributes would ensure taxation of the LLC as a partnership. 
The Wyoming LLC lacked continuity of life and free transferability of 
interests. Thus, a Wyoming LLC would always be treated as a partnership for tax 
purposes. However, such a bulletproof LLC statute limited the member's flexibility. 
To ensure the characteristics important for partnership taxation, many of the statute's 
provisions needed to be mandatory, thus reducing flexibility. For instance, members 
were not able to depart from partnership-like shares in order to establish shares as 
easily transferable as corporate shares. 
Nevertheless, after the 1988 IRS ruling the number of LLC filings in 
Wyoming and Florida increased. In addition, more and more states decided to join 
the LLC movement. In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners approved 
the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA). 15 This Act served as a model 
law for some states. By 1995, every US State had enacted its own LLC statute. 16 
Some States followed the Wyoming and Florida lead in enacting bulletproof LLC 
statutes. Others decided to start the second generation of LLC statutes. These more 
flexible statutes provided members with options concerning continuity of life, 
management and transferability of interests. However, they had the disadvantage that 
an LLC making use of these options might not have been taxed as a partnership. 
13 Rev Ru! 88-76, 1988-2 CB 360. 
14 Morrissey et al v Commissioner (1935) 296 US 344. This case primarily deals with trust issues. 
It was held that a business profit objective is not characteristic of an ordinary trust. 
15 The ULLCA is based on a combination of provisions relating to characteristics of other uniform 
acts, in particular the general partnership models, the limited partnership model, and the corporate 
models. Furthermore, it combines features of the Wyoming statute, the Delaware model and the 
"Prototype" LLC Act developed in 1992 by a working group of the American Bar Association. 
16 Robert W Hamilton Cases and Materials 011 Corporations Including Partnerships and limited 
liability Companies (7 ed, St Paul, Minnessota, 2001) 188. See Appendix I. 
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Taking effect on 1 January 1997, the IRS introduced the "check-the-box" 
regulations. These new rules eliminated the traditional corporate attribute analysis as 
outlined above. It was no longer necessary to negate such corporate characteristics as 
continuity of life, centralised management or transferability of interests in order to be 
treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes. At the time of filing or shortly 
afterwards, the LLC could now simply elect to be classified as a corporation or a 
partnership for tax purposes. Even if no choice is made at all, the LLC will be 
automatically treated as a partnership in most cases. The "check-the-box" regulations 
thus have expanded the options and led to the third generation of LLC statutes being 
able to provide even more flexible rules. 
III THE LLC IN THE CONTEXT OF US COMPANY LAW 
It has already been implied that the US LLC is not a modification of 
traditional business forms, but represents the creation of a new company form. 
There 1s a need to distinguish this new form from other traditional 
US business forms, and consider the similarities and differences. 17 However, the 
precise legal classification of the LLC is highly controversial. 
A US Corporate Law 
For vanous purposes, courts have held the LLC to be a corporation. 18 
At first sight, this might be appealing, as both the LLC and all forms of corporations 
enjoy limited liability protection. However, corporations are generally taxable at the 
entity-level, thus not benefiting from pass-through taxation as the LLC. 19 
The Close Corporation may allow shareholders to dispense from various corporate 
formalities, but is still subject to double taxation.20 Though double taxation can be 
17 See Appendix 2. 
18 In Fraser v Major League Soccer, LLC (2000) 97 F Supp 2d 130, 135 (Mass), an LLC was treated 
as a corporation with regard to antitrust law: "The cases do illustrate how courts generally understand 
the LLC structure to be like that of a corporation and generally apply legal rules applicable to 
corporations to LLCs,, .In the present context, there is little reason to treat an LLC differently from a 
corporation." In addition, some courts have held that LLCs more closely resemble corporations than 
partnerships in non-antitrust contexts as well. For instance, in Exchange Point LLC v US SEC 
( 10 June 1999) WL 386736 at 3 (NY) the court held that an LLC is more similar to a corporation than 
a partnership and thus not a person for the purposes of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978. 
19 For a more extensive look at US tax law, see part VB 2 of this paper. 
20 Robert W Hamilton Cases and Materials on Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited 
Liability Companies (7 ed, St Paul, Minnessota, 2001) 163. 
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avoided if incorporating as an S Chapter Corporation, contrary to the LLC, 
the S Chapter Corporation features a broad range of restrictions. For instance, the 
number of shareholders is limited to 75 and shareholders must either be US citizens 
or permanent residents. 21 Therefore, no type of corporation can claim to resemble the 
LLC in general terms. 
B US Partnership Law 
For some purposes, courts have also held the LLC to be a partnership.22 
It is emphasised that both the LLC and all partnerships enjoy pass-through taxation. 
However, all forms of partnership have at least one, but mostly more distinguishing 
features. 
In contrast to a general partnership, an LLC cannot be implied at law or exist 
by estoppel. 23 Furthermore, unlike LLC members all partners are personally liable 
for the entity's debts. Liability also differentiates the limited partnership. In a limited 
partnership, at least one partner, the general partner, is personally liable. 
In comparison, all LLC members and managers enjoy limited liability protection. 
Finally, the LLC features various differences with regard to the LLP.24 The LLP is a 
modified traditional partnership form, where a general partnership can register to 
provide all partners with limited liability protection. Traditionally, the LLP form was 
reserved for professionals, whereas today most states have opened it up to all kinds 
of businesses. The LLP is not only bound to partnership law, but there is also an 
abundance of technical differences compared to the LLC. 
21 Robert W Hamilton Cases and Materials on Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited 
Liability Companies (7 ed, St Paul , Minnessota, 2001) 163. 
22 In Cosgrove v Bartolotta ( 1998) 150 F 3d 729, 731 (Wis), the court had to decide whether an LLC 
is a citizen of the state. The court held that "given the resemblance between an LLC and a limited 
partnership ... we conclude that the citizenship of an LLC. . .is the citizenship of its members ." This has 
been confirmed in JMTR Enterprises, LLC v Duchin (1999) 42 F Supp 2d 87, 94 (Mass) . Here the 
court held that "there is no justification for treating a limited liability company like a corporation." 
23 Jacob Rabkin et al Current Legal Forms with Tax Analysis (New York, 2002) s 18A.Ol. 
24 Texas enacted the first LLP statute in 1991 in response to lawyers being subject to enormous claims 
because of their involvements in the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s. By 1999, all states had 
enacted statutes authorising LLP registration. See for example Wyoming Registered Limited Liability 
Partnership Act, codified at Wyo Stat Ann 1977, ss 17-21-1101 to - 1106. For a detailed comparison 
of LLC and LLP see Fallany O Stover and Susan Pace Hamill "The LLC Versus LLP Conundrum: 
Advice for Businesses Contemplating the Choice" ( 1999) 50 Ala L Rev 813. 
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In conclusion, it has been shown that the LLC combines both corporation and 
partnership characteristics.25 For some purposes it is held to resemble a corporation, 
for some purposes it is rather treated as a partnership. Therefore, it is difficult if not 
impossible to classify this business entity exclusively as a form of corporation or 
partnership. However, there is no need for such a classification. The LLC is neither a 
corporation nor a partnership. It has emerged as a new and independent business 
form. It cannot be slotted to the traditional categories, but creates a new category in 
US business law. 26 In summary: "The allure of the limited liability company is its 
unique ability to bring together in a single business organization the best features of 
all other business forms, - properly structured, its owners obtain both a corporate-
style liability shield and the pass-through tax benefits of a partnership."27 
IV THE LLC IN THE CONTEXT OF GERMAN COMPANY LAW 
This paper argues that the US LLC should be used as a role model for 
German reform. The argument is based on the assumption that an LLC-like business 
form is currently missing in German company law. This assumption can be proven 
by comparing the US LLC to existing German business forms. 
A German Corporate Law 
The striking feature of the LLC is limited liability protection. As this attribute 
1s traditionally linked to corporate law, the corresponding German business 
form could be a corporation, particularly the GmbH.28 
25 In Great lakes Chem Corp v Monsanto Co (2000) 96 F Supp 2d 376, 383 (Del), the purchaser of an 
LLC alleged securities fraud. It was held that interests in an LLC are not securities for the purposes of 
the federal securities law. As part of the obiter dicta, the court stated: "LLCs are hybrid entities that 
combine desirable characteristics of corporations, limited partnerships, and general partnerships." 
26 Warren H Johnson "Limited Liability Companies (LLC): Is the LLC Liability Shield Holding Up 
Under Judicial Scrutiny?" 35 New Eng L Rev 177, 181. 
27 PB Real Estate, Inc V DEM II Properties (1998) 719 A2d 73, 74 (Conn App Ct). Here, the court 
held that payments owners made to themselves from the company assets constituted distributions and 
are, therefore, subject to turnover orders. The above-mentioned citation is part of the obiter dicta. 
28 German company law recognises two fom1s of incorporation, the Aktiengesellschaft (AG) and the 
Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung (GmbH). The AG was first regulated in the Allgemeines 
Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch (ADHGB) of 1861 , but outsourced to the Aktiengesetz (AktG) in 1937. 
The GmbH was introduced in 1892 by the Gesetz betrejfend die Gesel/schaften mit beschriinkter 
Haftung (GmbHG). The basic difference is that the AG was designed to be a publicly traded company, 
whereas the GmbH was designed to be privately held. Both the AktG and the GmbHG can be found at 
http:i/www.bundesregiern1w.de/-.4 l 8/Gese tze.htm (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
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The GmbH is sometimes even identified as one of the precursors of the US 
LLC, so it is no surprise that numerous courts and scholars actually see the GmbH as 
the German counterpart to the LLC. 29 However, such a classification evidently puts 
too much emphasis on liability. Liability protection is a dominant but not the 
exclusive feature of the LLC. It needs to be considered that the LLC is taxed as a 
partnership and exhibits a partnership-like governance regime. The GmbH, therefore, 
is not the corresponding business form in German law - at least from a purely 
theoretical viewpoint. Nevertheless, besides all theoretical differences the LLC and 
the GmbH address the same kind of entrepreneurs. Both business forms 
predominantly approach small and medium-sized businesses that strive for limited 
liability. Therefore, as far as a practical viewpoint is concerned, LLC and GmbH are 
comparable business forms. 
B German Partnership Law 
In particular when looking at tax treatment and flexible entity governance, 
the LLC may rather resemble a German partnership form. First, the general 
partnership (BGB-Gesellschaft; GbR) could be the corresponding form. A few years 
ago, this evaluation could be proved incorrect simply because - in contrast to the 
LLC - the GbR was widely denied legal capacity.30 However, this has changed only 
recently. The Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof; BGH) has adjudicated 
that the GbR, though not being a corporate body, possesses legal capacity for 
practically any purpose. 31 Nevertheless, in a second judgment the BGH further 
decided that there is no way to limit liability in a GbR except by having an explicit 
agreement with the creditor.32 
29 Karin Schwindt "Limited Liability Companies: Issues in Member Liability" ( 1997) 44 UCLALR 
1541 , FN 3. Warren H. Johnson "Limited Liability Companies (LLC): Is the LLC Liability Shield 
Holding Up Under Judicial Scrutiny?" 35 New Eng L Rev 177, FN 10. In TMT North Am Inc v Magic 
Touch GmbH ( 1997) 124 F3d 876, 879 (7th Cir), the court characterised a GmbH in the obiter dicta as 
"somewhat analogous to an American LLC." 
30 Peter Ulmer Miinchener Komm entar zum BOB (3 ed, Beck, Munich, 1997) s 705, para 8; Egon 
Schneider "Tendenzen und Kontroversen in der Rechtsprechung: Die wachsende Bedeutung der GbR" 
(1998) 1998 MDR 690,693 . 
31 BGH (2001) 2001 NJW 1056. The BGH had to decide whether a GbR has the capacity to sue and 
be sued. The BGH held that a GbR can take almost any legal position. For instance, a GbR can be 
partner to a contract or hold property. Furthermore, the BGH expressly acknowledged the GbR's 
capacity to sue and be sued. 
32 BGH ( 1999) 1999 NJW 3483. In this case, the BGH had to decide whether the partners in a GbR 
are liable for business debts even though they included a clause in the partnership agreement that 
excludes their liability. The BHG held that such an exclusion clause is without any external effect. 
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Being a partner in a GbR, therefore, always results in personal liability. 
While, therefore, the GbR is not the corresponding company form, the counterpart of 
the US LLC could be the limited partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft; KG). 33 
The KG is different from the LLC in that at least one partner, the general partner, is 
personally liable for the entity's debts whereas the LLC provides limited liability for 
all members. Over the years, however, German practitioners developed a special 
form of the KG, the GmbH & Co. KG.34 It is possible to have a corporate body, for 
example the GmbH, as the only general partner. Because the GmbH shareholders all 
enjoy limited liability protection, there is no personal liability for the KG's debts. By 
using this legal construction, the benefit of limited liability can be combined with the 
advantages of pass-through taxation, this being similar to the US LLC. However, the 
GmbH & Co. KG suffers from a range of disadvantages. At the outset, when forming 
a GmbH & Co. KG two companies need to be established, a KG and also a GmbH. 
Furthermore, not only partnership law is to be applied. German courts additionally 
apply corporate principles and have developed a set of special rules. 35 Overall, the 
GmbH & Co. KG lacks much of the flexibility normally aligned with a partnership 
form. Therefore, though combining limited liability and pass-through taxation, it 
does not bear resemblance of the LLC. 
Finally, the professional partnership (Partnerschaftsgesellschaft; PartG) 
might be the accurate counterpart of the LLC.36 However, the PartG limits liability 
only in so far, as a partner is not liable for liability arising out of another partner's 
professional malpractice. 37 Secondly, the PartG exclusively applies to professional 
persons.38 In respect of all that, the PartG features too many differences to be 
characterised as the corresponding business form of the LLC. 
33 The KG is governed by ss 161 to 177a Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB; Commercial Code). The HGB is 
available at http://www.bundesregienmg.de/Gesetze (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
34 The GmbH & Co KG was first acknowledged by the Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, the 
highest Bavarian state court, in 1912; federal courts looked at the GmbH & Co. KG as a permissible 
business form from 1922 on, RGZ 105, 101. For more details see Karlheinz Boujong et al HGB 
(Beck, Munich, 2001) s 16, para 14. 
35 Adolf Baumbach und Klaus Hopt HGB (3 ed, Beck, Munich, 2000) App s 177a, para 1. 
36 By enacting the Partnerschaftsgesellschaftsgesetz (PartGG) in 1995, the German legislator has 
created a new business form for the very first time since 1892, see see Peter Ulmer Miinchener 
Kommentar zum BGB (3 ed, Beck, Munich, 1997) PartGG, paras 1 to 29. The PartGG is available at 
http ://www.bundesregiemng.de/Gesetze (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
37 S 8(1), (II) PartGG. 
38 S l(I)(l) PartGG. 
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In conclusion, there is no German business form that completely corresponds 
to the US LLC. Similar to the analysis of US company law, the discussion of German 
law has shown that the LLC combines corporate and partnership attributes and, 
therefore, cannot be clearly allocated to either side. However, as already mentioned 
above, this is limited to a purely theoretical viewpoint. From a practical perspective, 
the GmbH certainly is the most appropriate counterpart. Thus, the following parts of 
this paper focus on comparing GmbH and LLC. 
V SHOULD GERMANY ADOPT THE US MODEL? 39 
The GmbH is Germany's preferred business form for small and medium-
sized businesses that strive for limited liability. This paper argues that businesses 
should have an additional choice, an LLC-like company form. To prove the case for 
this thesis, a comparison is drawn between the GmbH and the LLC. Within the scope 
of the comparison, it will be seen that LLC and GmbH feature a number of 
similarities but predominantly striking differences. Those differences mainly turn out 
to be advantages of the LLC form. In particular flexible capital rules and the 
possibility of decentralised management will be identified as such advantages. 
The comparison of further issues, such as formation procedures, meetings and voting 
or profit distribution, also illustrates that the LLC form is the more convenient 
business form for small and medium-sized businesses. 
A The Underlying Conflict 
Most if not all advantages of the LLC arising within the scope of this analysis 
are to the benefit of the entrepreneur. However, aspects favouring the entrepreneur 
are often disadvantageous to the company's creditors. For instance, the absence of a 
minimum share capital requirement certainly benefits the entrepreneur, as he can set 
up a company with less capital. On the other hand, creditors face the disadvantage 
that there may be companies on the market with insufficient capital resources. 
39 According to the German Ministry of Justice, there is no need for a new business form. The PartG is 
supposed to be a suitable form for professionals whereas others can use the GmbH and the 
GmbH & Co. KG; this information was given in response to an e-mail-request to the Ministry of 
Justice on 11 April 2003. 
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Consequently, both sides of each aspect have to be taken into consideration. 
Only if the advantages for the businesses outweigh the disadvantages for the 
creditors, a point for law reform is made. The question of new regulations can, 
therefore, be explained in terms of a tradeoff between the need for creditor protection 
and the commitment to supply legal rules that enable owners to maximise wealth.40 
Nevertheless, the following analysis will show that the objective of creditor 
protection unreasonably prevails over business interests. Moreover, the protection 
mechanisms for creditors as part of German GmbH law are to a great extent 
ineffective. Therefore, the current status should not be retained. It is urgently 
necessary to implement a new LLC-like company form. 
B Comparative Analysis OfGmbH And LLC 
The following analysis companng GmbH and LLC proves that the LLC 
provides a far more convenient business form for small and medium-sized 
businesses. The analysis is divided into six parts. A brief reflection on powers, 
liability and tax law is followed by an evaluation of formation procedures. Moreover, 
capital structure and management issues come up for discussion. Finally, member-
related issues will be compared. 
Supposedly, the extent of statutory regulation is a good starting point. 
The GmbHG comprises 114 provisions amounting to 12,771 words, whereas the 
Wyoming LLC statute only consists of 43 provisions totalling 8,462 words.41 
When comparing the regulatory density, it needs to be considered that the LLC 
provisions contain more detailed language than the rather abstract GmbH provisions. 
The LLC statute, therefore, covers even less topical areas as suggested by the crude 
number of words. In contrast, the GmbHG sets up a far more extensive regime 
consisting of a broad range of mandatory provisions and statutory default rules. 
In regard to the GmbHG, non-compliance is much more likely to occur. 
4° Company Law Review Steering Group, Department of Trade and Industry Modern Company Law 
for a Competitive Economy: Final Report (2001), at http://,,ww.dti.gov.uk/cld/final report/index.htm 
(last accessed 25 September 2003). 
41 As merger rules are not part of the GmbHG, the merger provisions of the LLC statute have not been 
included in this comparison. GmbH merger provisions are part of the Umwandlungsgesetz (UmwG), 
available at http://www.bundesregiernng.de/-A 18/Gesetze.htm (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
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1 Powers and liability 
Both GmbH and LLC are separate legal entities that may acquire and hold 
property and can sue and be sued in their own name.42 However, differences as to the 
entity's powers occur when taking into account the ultra vires doctrine. This doctrine 
restricts the powers of a company. The company statute itself or the company's 
articles set out those acts that the company has the right and the scope to undertake. 
According to the ultra vires doctrine, any acts that fall outside those limits are void.43 
The ultra vires rule thus is a regulatory device, which prevents a company from 
entering into any type of transaction that exceeds the scope of the company's 
contractual capacity. The doctrine is not part of German corporate law.44 It does, 
however, generally restrict the powers of US companies.45 In this regard, the 
LLC is no exception. The powers of an LLC are subject to the limits established by 
the ultra vires doctrine. This is first indicated by an extensive list of company 
powers as included in the Wyoming LLC statute.46 Such a list points to an active 
ultra vires doctrine, as it would make no sense to itemise specific powers if the 
company's powers are unrestricted. This finding is confirmed by case law.47 
The ultra vires doctrine has been developed to protect members against 
undesired business expansions. However, it is disadvantageous regarding the 
protection of legitimate and reasonable business relationships. Third party protection 
and contractual freedom argue for potentially unlimited company powers.48 
42 S 13(1) GmbHG; @17-15-104. 
43 Robert W Hamilton Cases and Materials on Corporations lncludi11g Partnerships and limited 
liability Companies (7 ed, St Paul, Minnessota, 2001) 262. 
44 The ultra vires doctrine is not compatible with s 37(II) GmbHG ; the aforementioned section 
provides that a restriction of the manager's authority is without any effect on third parties, see 
Guenther H Roth and Holger Altrneppen GmbH-Gesetz (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003), s 3, para 7. 
45 Nevertheless, Robert W Hamilton speaks of the "decline of (the) doctrine of ultra vires". 
Besides various cases, he cites s 3.04 of the Model Business Corporation Act as amended through 
31 December 2001, whereupon the validity of corporate action may not be challenged on 
the ground that the corporation "lacks or lacked power to act.", Robert W Hamilton Cases 
and Materials on Corporations - Including Partnerships and limited liability Companies 
(7 ed, West Publishing Co, St Paul , 2001) 270. 
46 @!7-15-104. 
47 EZ Auto, LLC v H M Jr Auto Sales (31 July 2002) Le is 5560 (Tex Ct App). In this case, a car 
dealer brought action against an LLC to recover a balance due on a car purchased by the manager of 
the LLC on behalf of the LLC. The court generally acknowledged that the ultra vires doctrine applies 
to LLCs. However, in this case it was held that the manager had actual authority to bind the LLC. 
48 An ultra vires doctrine in German corporate law would breach European law anyway, see First 
Directive on Company Law, Directive 68/151, OJ, L 65/8, Article 9(1): "Acts done by the organs of 
the company shall be binding upon it even if those acts are not within the objects of the company ... ". 
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Besides the issue of company powers, liability needs to be mentioned. 
The two statutes briefly state that liability is generally restricted to the entity.49 
Personal liability of shareholders or members only arises as an exception, first if 
individual liability is incurred50 or, secondly, if the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil applies. It is commonly accepted that the doctrine of piercing the veil applies to 
LLCs.51 The doctrine, however, is also a well-established part of GmbH law.52 
Similar to the situation under US law, piercing the veil in Germany is not regulated 
by statute, but has been developed by the courts over many years. The governing 
rules could, therefore, be applied to a German LLC without any problems, and 
additional statutory regulation would not be necessary. This at least facilitates the 
implementation of a new limited liability vehicle in Germany. 
2 Taxation 
At first sight, taxation seems to make a great difference as the GmbH is taxed 
as a corporation, and the LLC generally as a partnership. The LLC's tax 
classification in conjunction with the liability protection is one of the major factors 
for its success. 53 Being taxed as a partnership means that the LLC enjoys pass-
through taxation, the taxable income, loss, credits and deductions of the entity 
flowing through to its members. Therefore, the company's profits are taxed just once. 
There is no taxation of LLC profits at the entity level. Profits are only taxed at the 
member level, meaning that profits are subject to the member's personal income tax 
as soon as they are distributed.54 It has to be kept in mind that according to the 
"check-the-box rules", the LLC is not bound to the partnership tax status, but may 
alternatively elect to be taxed as a corporation. 55 
49 S 13(II) GmbHG; @ 17-15-113. 
so Through negligence or guarantees, see Kendal R Hoopes "Liabilities of Members and Managers of 
Wyoming Limited Liability Companies" (1999) 34 Land & Water L Rev 463. 
5t In Kaycee Land and livestock v Roger Flahive (2002) 43 P 3d 323 (Wyo Supr C), a landowner 
brought action for damages against an LLC and its managing member. The court held that the remedy 
of piercing the veil is an available remedy under the LLC legislation; William A Klein and J Mark 
Ramseyer Business Associations (3 ed, Westbury, New York, 1997) 225 ; Robert R Keating 
"The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity" (1992) 47 Bus Law 375 , 442 . 
52 The piercing doctrine is known as Durchgriffshaftung, see Guenther H Roth and Holger Altrneppen 
Cmbf-f-Cesetz ( 4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003), s 13, para 20. 
53 Robert W Hamilton Cases and Materials on Corporations - Including Partnerships and Limited 
Liability Companies (7 ed, West Publishing Co, St Paul, 2001) 161. 
54 William A Klein and J Mark Ramseyer Business Associations (3 ed, Westbury, New York, 1997) 
96; Joseph A Rodriguez "Wyoming Limited Liability Companies: Limited Liability and Taxation" 
(1992) 27 Land & Water L Rev 539. However, an annual LLC tax of US$ I 00 applies, @ 17-15-132. 
55 J William Callison "Unincorporated Business Entities: Federalism, Regulatory Competition and the 
Limited Liability Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded" (2001) 26 Iowa J Corp L 
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In contrast, GmbH profits are generally taxed twice, both at the entity and at 
the shareholder level. First, GmbH profits are subject to a 25 per cent corporate 
income tax.56 Secondly, distributed profits are then taxed at the shareholder level.57 
However, in order to reduce double taxation, only half of the distributed profits are 
subject to the shareholders' personal income tax ("Halbeinkunfteverfahren"). 58 
This procedure practically cuts in half the personal income tax rate. As a result, 
distributed corporate profits are still subject to two taxes: corporate income tax and 
personal income tax. However, as shareholders virtually pay a reduced personal 
income tax rate, the fact of double taxation is compensated. 59 
In conclusion, taxation may have a different starting point. With the German 
tax law reducing double taxation to the greatest possible extent, however, the 
practical implications differ only slightly. 60 In contrast to the US situation, tax law is 
not the crucial incentive for German reform. Nevertheless, it has and will be shown 
that various other issues support the argument for a new business form in Germany. 
3 Formation 
Attention should further be paid to formation procedures. The GmbH, as a 
corporation, is formed within the context of a highly evolved statute and more than a 
century of (sophisticated) judicial case law. By contrast, although the LLC formation 
process is fairly corporate-like, the Wyoming LLC statute resembles partnership law 
in that it imposes fewer rules. Overall, the formation of an LLC requires fewer 
efforts than the creation of a GmbH. 
951 , 961 ; Tassma A Powers and Deby L Forry "Partnership Taxation & The Limited Liability 
Company: Check Out the Check-the-Box Entity Classification" ( I 997) 32 Land & Water L Rev 831. 
56 See ss I , 23(1) KStG. Corporate tax law has been subject to recent reforms: Gesetz zur 
Fortentwicklung des Unternehmenssteuerrechts (20 December 2001 , BGBl I, 3858); see Dieter Birk 
Steuerrecht (5 ed, CF Muller, Heidelberg, 2002) 318. 
57 S 20(1) No I EStG. 
58 S 3 No 40 Id EStG. 
59 Simplified example: Partnership A (partners B and C) and GmbH D (shareholders E and F) both 
show a profit of €60,000. First: Partnership A. All profits are equally distributed to B and C, each of 
them being entitled to €30,000. Profits are only subject to the personal income tax, here assumably the 
top rate of 48.5 per cent. Therefore, both A and B receive €15,450. Second: GmbH D. Profits are first 
subject to a 25 per cent corporate income tax, leaving €45,000 to be equally distributed to E and F 
(€22,500 each) . According to the Halbeinkuenfteverfahren, only half of these distributed profits are 
subject to the personal income tax. Therefore, € 11 ,250 are tax-free, € 11 ,250 are subject to the 48.5 per 
cent personal income tax. Therefore, both E and F receive €1 7,043 .75 . 
60 Practical differences as to the assessment and collection have not been considered. Nevertheless, 
the amount of the taxable income and the tax rate are the most important features. 
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At the outset, both GmbH and LLC may consist of at least one natural or 
legal person.61 Only the GmbHG prescribes special rules for single-person-entities. 
It is claimed that the likelihood of malpractices and fraudulent use of the 
entity is reduced by having a multitude of shareholders and thus a system of 
"checks and balances". 62 The asserted deficiencies in case of a single-person entity 
are intended to be compensated by special rules, which are mostly designed to 
increase the standard of creditor protection.63 In the following, not only the 
aforementioned special rules shall be highlighted, but also the essential steps to bring 
into existence both GmbH and LLC will be outlined. 
(a) Articles of organisation 
The first formation step is to draft articles of organisation. Both GmbH and 
LLC articles must feature some compulsory contents. Beyond these, facultative 
provisions can be added. Finally, formal requirements have to be considered. 
(i) Compulsory contents 
The articles' compulsory contents are prescribed by mandatory provisions.64 
In general, similarities are more apparent than differences. First, the company name 
must be stated. The German law governing the choice of a company name has been 
liberalised extensively, 65 so today similar rules apply for GmbH and LLC. 
The company name must be distinguishable and not misleading. 66 It also has to 
include the term "Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung" respectively 
"limited liability company" or an abbreviation.67 The failure to comply with these 
name requirements attracts personal liability. 
61 S 1 GmbHG; @17-15-144(d). For years, a single-person-GmbH could only be generated if, 
subsequent to the formation, all interests would be transfened or bequeathed to one person. The initial 
single-person-GmbH was introduced in 1980, forced by a European directive. The Wyoming statute 
still requires to have at least two members (@17-15-106), but allows single-person-entities as an 
exception, if the members choose to be a flexible LLC pursuant to @l 7-15-144(d). 
62 Guenther H Roth and Holger Altmeppen GmbH-Gesetz (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003), s I, para 6. 
63 For instance, s 7(II) GmbHG prescribes that all contribution(s) have to be made prior to the filing of 
the articles, and not only 25 per cent as generally required. 
64 For the GmbH see ss 3, 5(IY) GmbHG (132 words) , for the LLC see @ 17-15-107 (424 words) . 
65 See Karlheinz Boujong et al Handelsgesetzbuch (Beck, Munich, 2001) s 17, para 4. 
66 Ss 17, 18, 6(II) HGB, 13(III) GmbHG, @17-15-105. 
67 S 4 GmbHG; @17-15-105(b). 
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Only the LLC can reserve a name before actually filing the articles.68 
German company law lacks a respective provision. However, the desired name can 
be protected all the same. Prior to the notarisation of the articles, the potential 
shareholders may form a partnership by stipulating a simple partnership agreement. 69 
The name as used by this partnership is legally protected.70 With the notarisation, 
a so-called Vor-GmbH comes into existence, a preform of the later GmbH. As the 
former partnership ceases to exist, the Vor-GmbH may use the partnership's name. 71 
After finally registering as a GmbH, the legal form (GmbH) has to be added to the 
name, and the name can then be used henceforth. In conclusion, German law makes 
it possible to protect a name, however, in a very complicated manner. 
Besides the company name, the GmbH articles must indicate the company's 
registered office, whereas the LLC articles have to include name and address of a 
registered agent. 72 While the LLC requirement provides for the greatest possible 
flexibility, s 4a(II) GmbHG even restricts the choice of the registered office. It has to 
be located at the place of production, management or administration. 
Thirdly, in both the GmbH and the LLC articles the company's purpose has 
to be stated. In general, this can be any lawful purpose. 73 Whereas for the LLC 
banking and insurance are excluded, in the case of the GmbH, restrictions for 
professionals may apply.74 Fourthly, the capital structure has to be disclosed. Both 
GmbH and LLC articles must indicate the amount of share capital and the 
contributions in kind. However, only the GmbHG calls also for cash contributions to 
be listed. Furthermore, a limitation of the company's duration has to be included.75 
Beyond these five requirements, only the LLC statute demands further compulsory 
contents, for example the admission of new members, names and addresses of 
managers and the possible choice to be a flexible or a close LLC. 76 
68 See @ 17-15-105(d). 
69 Such a company is known as Vorgruendungsgesellschaft. 
70 See ss 12 BGB, 37 HGB. The BGB is the Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code), 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/-.4 J 8/Gesetze.htm (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
71 It is only necessary to add the legal form, here i. G. for in Gruendung ( in the process of formation). 
72 For details regarding the registered agent, see @17-15-110. 
73 SI GmbHG,@17-15-103. 
74 To give an example, for many years German lawyers were not allowed to organise as a GmbH. Just 
recently, the legislator has acknowledged the lawyer-GmbH (s 59c BRAO). 
75 S 3(1) GmbHG. 
76 Whereas the formation as a flexible LLC (@ 17-15-144) reduces the extent of statutory regulation, 
the formation as a close LLC (@17-25-101 to 109) results in further restrictions to the members' 
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(ii) Additional contents 
The articles are not limited to contain only the compulsory statements. 
Beyond that, the articles - or a separate operating agreement - may include 
additional stipulations.77 Whereas it is common for the GmbH to have detailed 
articles, setting up an operating agreement is the usual procedure for the LLC.78 
Naturally, mandatory provisions restrict party autonomy. As shown throughout this 
analysis, the GmbHG contains more mandatory provisions, therefore leaving less 
party autonomy to the participants in the end. 
(iii) Required form 
Both GmbH and LLC articles must comply with certain formal requirements. 
GmbH articles have to be in writing, signed by all shareholders and notarially 
certified.79 In contrast, LLC articles must only be in writing and signed by the 
organiser.80 The organiser may, but need not be a member of the LLC. The filing 
may also be done by a third person (promoter). 81 This is a concession to foreign 
investors, and also enables a confidential formation, as the names of the members do 
not have to be disclosed. 
rights as far as transfer of ownership interest, withdrawal or resignation from the company, return of 
capital contributions or dissolution matters are concerned. 
77 S 45 GmbHG; @ 17-15-104(x), @ 17-15-107(xi). 
78 In Bubbles and Bleach LLC v Becker (16 May 1997) Lexis 7471 (US Dist), it was held that the 
operating agreement is an agreement between the members, not the members and the LLC. In 
Advanced Orthopedics, LLC v Moon ( 1995) 656 So 2d 1103 (La Ct App), the court held that a 
missing operating agreement does not prove the non-existence of an LLC, neither does the failure to 
sign an existing operating agreement work as dissolution. In Goldstein & Price v Tonkin & Mondi 
(1998) 974 SW 2d 543, 548 (Mo Ct App), it was held that a written operating agreement can be orally 
modified. 
79 S 2(1)( l) GmbHG. 
80 @ 17-15-106. See also @ 17-15-144(d), whereupon a single-member-LLC is possible. 
81 Under LLC law, it is possible for the promoter to take shares of the LLC as remuneration. Under 
GmbH law, remuneration can be payed only if the available assets exceed the share capital. However, 
because of the strict capital raising mles, it is not possible to directly give company shares as 
remuneration. See part VB 4 (c) of this paper. Marcus Lutter and Peter Hommelhoff GrnbH-Gesetz 
(15 ed, Dr. Otto Schmidt Verlag, Cologne, 2000) s 3, para 42. 
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(b) Filing proceedings 
Once the articles are drafted in the required form, they have to be filed to the 
competent authority. The GmbH articles have to be filed to the register court by the 
company's managers.82 More precisely, the filing has to be done by all managers.83 
The express requirement that all managers have to get involved in the GmbH filing 
process reveals a significant difference to LLC law. As already mentioned above, the 
LLC filing may be done by any prospective member or manager or even a third 
person. This clearly facilitates the formation process and, as mentioned before, 
enables a confidential entity formation. 
Filing of the GmbH articles is only allowed if at least 25 per cent of each cash 
contribution has been paid to the company, amounting to a minimum of €12,500.84 
In case of a single-person-GmbH, 25 per cent are not sufficient. The cash has to be 
paid completely or, alternatively, guarantees for the outstanding amount have to be 
provided. This special requirement is supposed to replace the outfall liability that 
occurs if a shareholder fails to perform his contribution in a several-member-
GmbH.85 Not only cash has to be (partly) contributed, also contributions in kind must 
be made prior to the filing. 86 As the GmbH does not come into existence before it is 
registered, the aforementioned filing requirements provide that a substantive part of 
the share capital has to be actually raised prior to the formation. 87 
Regarding the LLC, the original and one copy of the articles have to be filed 
to the Secretary of State by the organiser. 88 The LLC comes into existence once a 
certificate of formation has been issued. For that to happen, neither cash 
contributions nor contributions in kind have to be actually made. So in contrast to the 
GmbH, the implementation of contributions may be postponed to a date after the 
actual formation, enabling a far quicker and easier entity formation. 
82 S 7(I) GmbHG. 
83 Ss 78, 7(1) GmbHG. 
84 S 7(II) GmbHG . 
85 Pursuant to s 24 GmbHG, shareholders are not only liable for their own contribution, but also for all 
other contributions if one of the shareholders fails to make the contribution. This may, in the end, 
result in a liability up to the total amount of the share capital. 
86 S 7(111) GmbHG. 
87 Ss 19 FGG provide for appeal from denied registration. 
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(i) Required documentation; additional formation efforts 
When filing, a certain amount of documentation needs to be enclosed with the 
articles. In this regard, the GmbH is subject to an extensive regime. 89 At the outset, 
the articles have to be filed together with an application for registration, which needs 
to be certified.90 The application itself must only include sample signatures of all 
managers. 91 Articles and application must then be supplemented by a list of all 
shareholders indicating name, birthday, address and contribution. Moreover, the 
company must provide a shareholder resolution appointing one or more managers.92 
Fourthly, if contributions in kind are agreed upon, all documents relating to 
the respective legal transactions and a report on the contributions must be supplied.93 
The aforementioned report on contributions is statutorily required and has to be 
signed by all shareholders. It needs to contain detailed information on the character, 
age and value of all contributed assets. Also the valuation method has to be 
indicated, and the report must be supplemented with supporting evidence, for 
instance purchase documents and expert opinions.94 The filing documents then have 
to include a declaration of compliance signed by all managers. In this declaration, the 
managers must assert that the company has complied with all contribution 
requirements,95 and that there are no circumstances that conflict with their 
appointment.96 Finally, any needed permits have to be supplied. 97 
These far-ranging requirements certainly are burdensome and reduce the 
participants' flexibility. Gathering all information and the essential documents is a 
time-consuming matter. Particularly the report on contributions is also very cost-
intensive. In contrast, for the LLC far less documentation is needed. Only consent to 
appointment of the registered agent must be provided to the Secretary of State. 98 
88 @ 17-15-108(a). 
89 Sees 8 GmbHG (310 words) . 
90 S 12(1) HGB. 
9 1 S 35 HGB. 
92 This is necessary because centralised management is compulsory for the GmbH. 
93 Sees 5(IY) GmbHG. 
94 Guenther H Roth and Bolger Altmeppen CmbH-Cesetz (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003), s 8, para 6. 
95 To prove that cash contributions have been paid in the required extent, upon the register court's 
discretion the management may have to provide a bank confirmation, see BGHZ 113,335,345. 
96 Such circumstances are specified in s 6(II) GmbHG, for example criminal charges. 
97 For instance, banks need a permit pursuant to s 32(1) KWG, pubs and restaurants a permit pursuant 
to s 2 GastaettenG, retail businesses a permit pursuant to s 3(I) EinzelhandelsG, all available at 
http:/iwww.bundesregienm2..de/-.4 l 8!Ge etze. htm (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
98 @ 17-15-107(c). 
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Setting up a company not only involves filing articles and supplementary 
documentation. Throughout the fonnation process, additional paperwork may be 
necessary. Regarding the GmbH, the (potential) shareholders may enter into a pre-
incorporation agreement. Here, basic features of the proposed entity are ascertained 
before actually drafting the final articles. To be legally binding, such an agreement 
must be notarised.99 Secondly, individual subscription agreements are to be drafted. 
As contributions have to be made prior to filing the articles, legal transactions have 
to be conducted beforehand. 100 
Thirdly, centralised management calls for further efforts. As mentioned 
above, the shareholders have to make a decision appointing the management. 
In addition, a contract of service has to be drafted and signed, outlining in particular 
remuneration issues or non-competition clauses. Fourthly, the establishment of 
branch offices requires administrative efforts. This is in particular important for retail 
businesses. It is not sufficient to name the head office as registered office when 
registering the GmbH, but each single branch office has to be individually registered 
at the trade register. 101 Finally, the GmbH has to be registered at a specific 
department of the local government, as this department is competent for trade 
control. This registration is statutorily required, 102 but in comparison with the 
registration at the commercial register not a step to bring the GmbH into existence. 
For the LLC, less additional paperwork is necessary. The (potential) members 
may also enter in a pre-formation arrangement and subscription agreements can be 
necessary. Furthermore, the members might want to stipulate a management 
agreement, however, the paperwork for setting up a centralised management can be 
avoided, as the LLC is generally member-managed. 
99 Guenther H Roth and Holger Altmeppen GmbH-Gesetz (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003), s 2, para 48. 
10° For example, if a shareholder wants to contribute a piece of real estate, the transfer of title requires 
a notarised conveyance ofprope1ty and the registration in the land register, ss 873, 925 BGB, GBO. 
101 This is regulated by ss 13 et sqq HGB, comprising nine provisions amounting to 2,157 words. 
102 S 14 GewO, http ://w\\ \,\ .bunde regierung.de. -,41 .'Gesetze .htm (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
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(ii) Disclosure of information 
Having looked at the documents that have to be filed, it is also important to 
consider what becomes visible to the public. For most businesses it is favourable to 
disclose as little information as possible. Regarding the GmbH, the company name 
and seat, its purpose, the share capital, the names and authorisation of all managers, 
and the company's duration become part of the commercial register. 103 This register 
is not only open to the public without any limitation, 104 the registered information is 
also published in the Federal Bulletin and at least one regional newspaper. The LLC 
articles as well become a matter of public record. In contrast to some of the LLC 
statutes, however, the Wyoming statute requires no publication at all. 105 
(iii) Formation costs 
An important issue of formation is the question of cost. Naturally, cost 
requirements are mandatory. Besides raising the minimum share capital, formation 
costs for the GmbH are made up of notarisation, court and publication costs. 
The formation of a €25,000 GmbH costs approximately €1,500. Filing costs for a 
LLC with a share capital of up to US$50,000 are US$100. In conclusion, the 
formation of an LLC is generally cheaper than the formation of a GmbH. 
However, in the end formation costs for the LLC may even exceed formation 
costs for the GmbH, as the LLC faces higher costs for legal services. 106 
The LLC statute, contrary to the GmbHG, does not provide for a broad range of 
operational rules. Therefore, the costs for drafting a proper LLC operating agreement 
are likely to be in excess of the costs for drafting reasonable GmbH articles, as the 
LLC agreement cannot rely on default rules and needs to be more comprehensive. 
However, as many of the GmbHG's operational rules are not only inappropriate for 
small finns but also mandatory in character, higher legal costs might be the 
reasonable prize for a smooth functioning of the business. 
103 S 10 GmbHG. The shareholders' names do not have to be registered, see Marcus Lutter and Peter 
Hommelhoff GmbH-Gesetz ( 15 ed, Dr. Otto Schmidt Yerlag, Cologne, 2000) s 10, para 5. 
104 See s 9(1) HGB. 
105 For example, s 206 of the New York statute requires weekly publication of detailed information in 
at least two newspapers for six consecutive weeks. 
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(c) Civil and criminal liability regarding formation 
For both GmbH and LLC, failure to comply with certain formation 
procedures attracts liability. As far as civil liability is concerned, participants are 
liable if they act in the name of the entity before the entity is actually formed. 107 
Secondly, incorrect statements and fraudulent behaviour may result in liability. 108 
As far as criminal liability is concerned, both GmbH and LLC participants are 
subject to a range of criminal provisions. 109 
As shown, the fact that involvement in formation procedures might incur civil 
or even criminal liability is characteristic for both GmbH and LLC. However, the 
GmbHG sets up a far more extensive regime of mandatory provisions. Therefore, 
non-compliance and, consequently, liability are more likely to occur for GmbH 
shareholders. Particularly because non-compliance needs not be intentional, this is a 
barrier for a smooth functioning of the business entity. For example, the GmbHG 
requires all contributions in kind to be valued accurately. 11° Failure to do so results in 
civil liability not only for the contributing shareholder, 111 but also for all other 
shareholders and managers. 112 A deliberate misrepresentation is not necessary to 
incur this ( civil) liability. However, if the incorrect statement has been given on 
purpose, also criminal liability might arise. 113 In contrast, the LLC statute does not 
contain any requirements as to the valuation of contributions in kind and, therefore, 
reduces the likelihood of any ( civil and criminal) liability. 114 
106 Charles W Murdock "Limited Liability Companies in the Decade of the 1990s: Legislative and 
Case Law Developments and Their Implications for the Future" (2001) 56 Bus Law 499,499. 107 S 1 l(II) GmbHG; @17-15-133. 
108 S 9a GmbHG;@17-15-132(b), @17-15-133. 
109 The GmbHG itself contains criminal provisions. Ss 82, 84, 85 GmbHG penalise incorrect 
statements, preferential treatment of selected creditors, and concealment of facts concerning 
insolvency proceedings. The Wyoming LLC statute, in contrast, does not contain any criminal 
provisions. However, other state and federal laws provide for various criminal provisions. 
For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) introduces criminal liability for anti-trust violations. 
Furthermore, s 1341, title 18, United States Code penalises mail fraud. 110 S 5(IV) GmbHG. 
111 S 9(1) GmbHG. 
112 S 9a(I) GmbHG. Liability pursuant to this section requires that an incorrect statement has been 
made. The indication of an incorrect value of contributed assets is such an incorrect statement. It 
needs to be emphasised that not only those shareholders and managers are liable that make the 
incorrect statement, but every shareholder and manager; see Marcus Lutter and Peter Hommelhoff 
GmbH-Gesetz ( 15 ed, Dr. Otto Schmidt Verlag, Cologne, 2000) s 9a, para 3. 113 S 82 GmbHG. 
114 A further example ofa transactional liability trap is presented in part VB 4 (b) (ii) of this paper. 
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Though being structured similar to a corporate formation, the formation of an 
LLC resembles a partnership formation in so far that the LLC statute provides only 
few mandatory rules. This leaves more flexibility to the members and enables an 
easier and quicker entity formation. Furthermore, the risk of non-compliance and 
thus (civil and criminal) liability is reduced. The only downside is that the LLC 
statute includes fewer default rules and requires the members to put more efforts in 
tailoring a comprehensive operating agreement, this naturally increasing legal costs. 
However, it needs to be considered that this situation might be more advantageous 
than having a whole range of operational rules if these rules are mandatory in 
character. This is the case for the GmbHG. Here, the shareholders are forced under a 
regime that often is inappropriate. For instance, the GmbHG provides a set of rules 
governing meetings and voting that is overly formal and restrictive and, therefore, for 
small and informal businesses unfitting. In conclusion, the formation process clearly 
is an advantage of the LLC form. 
(d) Overview: Minimum formation steps in a chronological order (table) 
GmbH LLC 
I. Draft articles: comply with requirements I. Draft articles: comply with requirements 
concerning compulsory contents and form. concerning compulsory contents and form. 
2. Shareholder resolution: appointment of 2. Not necessary if member-managed. 
management. 
3. Perform contributions. 3. Not necessary before filing. 
4. File articles and supplementary 4. File articles and supplementary 
documentation. documentation. 
0 Application for registration. 0 Written consent to appointment ofregistered 
0 List of all shareholders with details . agent. 
0 Shareholder resolution appointing the 
management. 
0 Documentation concerning contributions, in 
particular statutory report. 
0 Declaration of compliance of all managers. 
0 Any needed pemiits. 
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4 Capital structure 
It has been shown that the formation procedure for the GmbH and the LLC is 
structured similarly. However, as already pointed out, formation involves more 
administrative efforts for the GmbH. This 1s particularly true with regard to 
contribution requirements, leading directly to the aspect of capital structure. 
Here, the most striking differences between the two business forms are revealed. 
Differences become apparent not only with regard to contents, but also with regard to 
the nature of the respective provisions. Whereas the GmbHG mainly provides for 
mandatory capital rules, the LLC financial provisions predominantly take the form of 
default mechanisms, which may be varied by the articles or the operating agreement. 
An outline of the strict GmbH capital requirements and the straightforward 
LLC rules clearly shows that small and medium-sized businesses are far better off 
with the LLC regime. 
(a) Minimum share capital 
First, s 5(1) GmbHG reqmres a share capital of at least €25,000 for the 
GmbH. This comes along with exceedingly restrictive and overly complicated rules 
regarding the alteration of the share capital figure. 115 In contrast, the LLC statute 
requires no minimum share capital at all, and so allows for the formation of a 
business entity with less financial means. 
(i) No need for a minimum capital figure 
Most businesses would prefer the more flexible US system that abstains from 
a minimum share capital requirement. On the other hand, many academics point out 
the importance of such a concept. 116 The main argument that is frequently brought 
forward in favour of a minimum share capital is creditor protection. The required 
11 5 Capita l alterations are regulated in ss 55 et sqq GmbHG, comprising 26 provisions (3,371 words). 11 6 Adolf Baumbach and Goetz Hueck CmbHG ( 17 ed, Beck, Munich, 2000) s 5, para I; Guenther H 
Roth and Holger Altmeppen GmbHC (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 5, para 23; Jolm Armour "Share 
Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modem Company Law" (2000) 63 Mod L Rev 
355, 355. 
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capital figure is said to ensure a minimum level of assets. 11 7 It is even claimed that 
not only creditors but also shareholders are protected. 11 8 It is suggested that a solid 
financial basis for the company's operation increases the likelihood of economic 
success and, thereby, raises the shareholders' profits. 11 9 Furthermore, the requirement 
is said to act as a deterrent to fraudulent incorporations. 120 
However, a mm1mum share capital in fact does not achieve efficient 
protection of either creditors or shareholders. First, a minimum capital figure does 
not prevent the diminution of the capital through company losses, as there is no 
guarantee that assets will not be depleted through trading losses. 12 1 Even if a 
mm1mum capital figure could generally provide for creditor protection, the 
determination of an appropriate level is virtually impossible. A figure that is too low 
provides no protection at all. 122 A figure that is too high prevents businesses from 
entering the market. Consequently, a static capital figure fails to correspond to the 
specific capital needs of most businesses. 123 Furthermore, a system of minimum 
share capital generates costs. For instance, there are administrative costs of policing 
firms compliance, which generate a disproportionate burden on smaller companies. 
Finally, firms incapable of raising or maintaining the minimum are unable to obtain 
limited liability. This puts such firms at a competitive disadvantage, creating barriers 
to entry and thus reducing the competitive pressure on incumbent firms. 124 
11 7 Adolf Baumbach and Goetz Hueck GmbHG (17 ed, Beck, Munich, 2000) s 5, para 1; Guenther H 
Roth and Holger Altmeppen GmbHG (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 5, para 23 ; John Armour "Share 
Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modem Company Law" (2000) 63 Mod L Rev 
355, 355. 
11 8 Preamble to the Second Council Directive of 13 September 1976, 77 /9 I/EEC I 977 OJ L 26/ 1. 11 9 Preamble to the Second Council Directive of 13 September 1976, 77/91/EEC 1977 OJ L 26/ 1. 
120 Judith Freedman "Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms" (2000) 
63 Mod L Rev 317, 336. 
12 1 Guenther H Roth and Holger Altmeppen GmbHG (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 5, para 24 ; John 
Armour "Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modem Company Law" (2000) 
63 Mod L Rev 355 , 371. 
122 So it is claimed that €25 ,000 are not sufficient, Paulina Dejmek "Das kiinftige Europa und die 
Europaische Privatgesellschaft" (2001) 2001 NZG 878, 882. 
123 Guenther H Roth and Holger Altmeppen GmbHG (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 5, para 24 ; John 
Armour "Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modem Company Law" (2000) 
63 Mod L Rev 355 , 371 ; Rebecca J Huss "Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities : 
Forcing the Common Law Doctrine Into the Statutory Age" (2001) 70 U Cin L Rev 95, 131. 
124 Jolm Armour "Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modem Company Law" 
(2000) 63 Mod L Rev 355 , 371 
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Alternative concepts are much more promising to achieve creditor protection. 
For example, legislation on insolvency should be tightened. Furthermore, it might be 
worth considering not appointing managers unless they pass an examination or show 
fi . h h d" 125 1tness to run a company m some ot er way, sue as atten mg a course. 
Mandatory insurance could cover liability risks that arise from malpractice, this 
concept being already used for professional entities as the US LLP. 126 
With regard to German law, a look at European law further supports the 
argument against a minimum share capital. Having such a requirement would be a 
competitive disadvantage of the German business location to other European 
countries having no such requirement. 127 This is particularly true when taking into 
account recent judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In Centros 128 and 
the follow-up decision Ueberseering, 129 the ECJ adjudicated that a Member State of 
the European Communities has to acknowledge a company that has been effectively 
formed in another Member State. 13° Consequently, businesses can choose their place 
of formation according to the most flexible company law. This phenomenon of 
"forum shopping" puts Germany at a disadvantage, as most businesses would 
certainly choose a jurisdiction offering a limited liability vehicle that requires no 
minimum share capital. In conclusion, not only is the minimum share capital 
requirement an ineffective instrument of creditor protection, but keeping hold to this 
requirement also compromises Germany as a business location. 
125 J Hudson "The Limited Liability Company: Success, Failure and Future" (1989) 161 Royal Bank 
of Scotland Review 26. 
126 Rebecca J Huss "Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the Common 
Law Doctrine Into the Statutory Age" (200 I) 70 U Cin L Rev 95 , 131. 
127 For instance, the UK offers the LLP as an attractive alternative to the German GmbH. The UK LLP 
statute does not require a minimum share capital. 
128 C-212/97 (9 March 1999) OJ C 136 (15 May 1999) 3. The ECJ allowed an English Private Limited 
Partnership, which did not conduct business activities in any Member State, to establish a branch in 
Denmark, which was to conduct all the company's business activity. The ECJ held that Member States 
cannot refuse to recognise a company incorporated under the laws of another Member State 129 C-208/00 (5 November 2002) OJ C 323 (21 December 2002) 12. In this case, German courts had 
denied the capacity of a Dutch company to sue, as it did not meet the requirements of German 
company law. The ECJ held that this denial breached Articles 43, 48 EC Treaty. It thereby confirmed 
the holdings of Centros, whereupon a Member State has to recognise any company that has been 
effectively formed under the laws of another Member State. 
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(ii) Shelf companies 
According to the wording of s 5(1) GmbHG, the mm1mum share capital 
requirement only applies to the fom1ation process. As the formation of a GmbH is a 
time-consuming matter, quite a few businesses abstain from forming the GmbH 
themselves and instead buy an existing entity. This demand has lead to a roaring 
trade with shelf companies, meaning that GmbHs with basic features are solely 
formed for the reason of subsequent sale. The buyer can change the entity's articles 
and, thereby, adapt the GmbH according to his needs. 
The formation and sale of shelf companies 1s generally allowed under 
German law. 131 However, such a practice is likely to evade the minimum share 
capital requirement. The initial capital as raised by the seller may be exhausted, 
and the purchaser might not be willing to throw in new capital. New firms possibly 
start business activities without being equipped with the minimum share capital. 
The question is whether the purchaser has a legal duty to ensure that, at the time of 
sale, the GmbH has assets at least amounting to €25,000. Courts and scholars 
predominantly support the application of the minimum share capital requirement and, 
thereby, treat such a sale as a formation. 132 It is claimed that the sale and adaptation 
of a shelf company economically resembles the formation of a GmbH. Therefore, the 
purchaser is said to be liable for the statutory minimum figure of €25,000, 133 or even 
for the complete share capital if it exceeds the minimum figure. 134 
Evidently, this is an obstacle for German businesses. The practice of shelf 
companies helps to avoid many of the formation formalities and ensures quick 
availability of limited liability vehicles. The analogue application of the minimum 
capital requirement compromises this practice, as it means greater financial 
commitment and increases the reluctance to resort to shelf companies. 
130 In BGH (2002) 2002 NJW 3539, the BGH expressly acknowledged the ECJ's holdings . 
13 1 Guenther H Roth and Holger Altmeppen GmbHG (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 3, paras 11, 12. 
132 In BGH (2003) 2003 NZG 170, the BGH confirmed that the purchaser of a shelf GmbH has to 
ensure that the GmbH has, at the time of sale, assets amounting to at least €25,000. See also Adolf 
Baumbach and Goetz Hueck CmbHC (17 ed, Beck, Munich, 2000) s 3, para l 5. 
133 In LG Diisseldorf (2002) 2002 ZIP 2215, the court restricted the purchaser's liability in 
case of a shelf company sale to €25,000; also Adolf Baumbach and Goetz Hueck CmbHC 
(17 ed, Beck, Mw1ich, 2000) s 3, para 15. 
134 This is the BGH 's position, see the aforementioned judgement BGH (2003) 2003 NZG 170. 
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This practical argument is supported by the fact that outside the scope of a 
shelf company sale, an actively operating GmbH may undergo a structural change in 
order to take up different business activities. In this case, it is undisputed that the 
minimum capital requirement does not apply. 135 
The phenomenon of shelf companies exists in LLC law as well. LLCs are 
forn1ed with no particular purpose and are taken off the shelf when the need arises. 
Authorities that regulate company registration approve of this practice without 
restrictions. This backs up the argument for an LLC-like company form in Germany. 
Evidently, such a company form would not feature a minimum share capital and, 
therefore, not raise the concerns regarding the practice of shelf companies. 
(b) Form of contributions 
The mm1mum share capital is only one aspect of the capital structure. 
In addition to this, it needs to be examined as to how the agreed share capital can be 
contributed. Before looking at the rules governing the raising and maintenance of 
capital, possible forms of contributions need consideration. 
When recalling the process of formation as outlined above, it stands out that 
its complexity is to a great extent dependant on the kind of consideration agreed 
upon for the shares. In general, GmbH shareholders and LLC members can make 
cash contributions as well as contributions in kind. 136 Whereas cash contributions 
rarely cause severe problems, 137 contributions in kind are more likely to bring about 
complications. For the LLC this is not that obvious, as virtually anything of value 
can be contributed, including any kind of property, promissory notes and services. 138 
135 In BayObLG ( 1999) 1999 DStR 1036, the court denied any liability resulting from a shelf GmbH 
purchase regarding the (minimum) share capital figure. See also Guenther H Roth and Holger 
Altmeppen CmbHC (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 3, para 11; Holger Altmeppen 
"Zur Mantelverwendung in der GmbH - Besprechung von BGH, Beschluss vom 9. 12. 2002 - II ZB 
12/02" (2003) 2003 NZG 145 178. 
136 S 5 GmbHG; @ 17-15-115. 
137 However, problems can arise in two situations. First, a payment may not amortise the contribution 
debt if it is made prior to the creation of that debt. Secondly, it is discussed whether a cash payment 
amortises a contribution debt if the company's account is on the debits side or previous utilisation 
agreements exist; in BGH (2002) 2002 WM 967, the BGH held that neither a company account with a 
debit balance nor a previous utilisation agreement do affect payments by shareholders. 
138 @17-15-115. 
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In contrast, for the GmbH many restrictions apply. Generally, GmbH 
shareholders are also able to contribute any assets with an economic value. Different 
to the LLC, however, promissory notes and services cannot be contributed. 139 Further 
restrictions apply, which are not based upon a consistent system but a case-by-case 
approach. For instance, know-how and good will as such cannot be contributed. 140 
Overall, the restrictive GmbH regime forms an obstacle for German businesses. 
If there is ( restricting) case law, businesses might be forced to contribute cash instead 
of contributing other available assets. If courts have not yet decided about the 
validity of specific assets as a contribution, businesses have the burden of legal 
uncertainty, and bear the risk of non-compliance and liability. 141 This could result in 
an even greater reluctance to organise as a GmbH. 
(i) Contributing a business 
A particular aspect is the question whether it is possible to contribute a 
business. This is quite a practical issue, which particularly arises when an existing 
family business is to be transferred to a family-owned limited liability vehicle. 
Apparently, contributing a business is possible under LLC law, as it was shown that 
no restrictions as to contributions in kind apply. A valuation of the business might be 
desired by the LLC members or necessary for the purposes of federal tax law, 
but company law does not require it. The contribution has to conform only to the 
doctrine of consideration. Therefore, contributions have to represent an economic 
value, which does not necessarily have to be equivalent in value to the shares 
distributed for that contribution. 
GmbH law as well allows for such a contribution, as the GmbHG expressly 
acknowledges the possibility of contributing a business. 142 If the business as such is 
the subject of a contribution, there is an assumption that not only tangible but also 
intangible assets as know-how and good will are part of the contribution. 143 
139 S 27(II) AktG analogue; Uwe Hueffer AktG (5 ed, Beck, Munich, 2002) s 27, para 29. 
140 In BGH (1993) 1993 DB 323, the BGH held that know-how and good will as such cannot be 
contributed in exchange for GmbH shares. However, know-how and good will can be contributed as 
part ofa business, see pa11 VB 4 (b) (ii) of this paper. 
141 If the contribution is not valid, the shareholder has to pay cash, ss 19(Y), 5(IY) GmbHG. 
142 S 5(1V)(2) GmbHG ; general comments in Guenther H Roth and Holger Altrneppen GmbHG 
(4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 5, para 48 . 
143 Adolf Baumbach and Goetz Hueck GmbHG (17 ed, Beck, Munich, 2000) s 5, para 26. 
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However, requirements are quite intense. For a business to be contributed, the 
GmbHG requires to provide information about the annual profit or loss of the last 
two years. 144 Additionally, shareholders are likely to be asked for an expert 
valuation. 145 This is because the GmbHG does provide that contributions in kind 
have to be adequate, 146 and that the value of the contributed assets has to correspond 
to the shares issued for those assets. 147 Furthermore, the register court has to refuse 
the GmbH's registration if it is convinced that the value of the contributed assets is 
not appropriate. 148 Therefore, the register court routinely asks for an expert valuation 
if assets of a supposedly high and unpredictable value are to be contributed. 
The actual implementation of a business contribution differs remarkably, 
depending on the kind of business being contributed. In the case of a company, 
simply the shares can be contributed. 149 In the case of a sole proprietorship, 
the matter is rather complicated. Under German law, it is not possible to transfer the 
business as such, for example by registering the sale. 150 All assets have to be 
transferred individually, including realties, movables, and intangible assets. 
For know-how and good will, the transfer even requires an effective briefing, 
for instance the delivery of the customer list and information about previous 
experiences and trade secrets. 151 Obviously, this is overly cumbersome. Therefore, it 
is advisable not to contribute a family business as part of the formation of a GmbH, 
but to convert a sole proprietorship into a GmbH pursuant to the provisions of the 
UmwG. Such a conversion effects a universal succession of all titles and rights 
(and all liabilities) associated with the business. 152 In conclusion, the UmwG 
significantly facilitates the process of "contributing" a business. 
144 Sees 5(1Y)(2) GmbHG. 
145 Guenther H Roth and Holger Altmeppen GmbHG (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 8, para 6. 146 S 5(IV)(2) GmbHG. 
147 S 8(1) No 5 GmbHG. 
148 S 9(1) GmbHG. 
149 Adolf Baumbach and Goetz Hueck GmbHG ( 17 ed, Beck, Munich, 2000) s 5, para 30 
150 Adolf Baumbach and Klaus Hopt HGB (3 ed, Beck, Munich, 2000) ss l-475h, para 42. 
151 Adolf Baumbach and Klaus Hopt HGB (3 ed, Beck, Munich, 2000) ss l-475h, para 42. 
152 Adolf Baumbach and Goetz Hueck GmbHG ( 17 ed, Beck, Munich, 2000) s 5, para 26. Actually, 
the conversion of a sole proprietorship into a GmbH is not a conversion pursuant to ss 190 et sqq 
UmwG. These provisions only apply to companies (partnerships and corporations), but not to sole 
proprietorships. However, ss 152 et sqq UmwG provide the opportunity of a spin-off, which - in this 
case - resembles the character of a conversion. The business (sole proprietorship) is separated from 
the rest of the businessman 's private estate (spin-off), and commuted into a GmbH. So theoretically it 
is construed as a spin-off, but practically it is a conversion. The legal requirements for such a 
transaction are a written report outlining all relevants aspects (for example itemising the assets), an 
examination of the report by independent auditors, and the registration at the commercial register. 
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(ii) Concealed contributions in kind 
The previous remarks have addressed possible contributions in general, and 
the contribution of a business in particular. In the following, a third aspect needs to 
be mentioned, revealing that it is not the GmbHG alone creating a regulatory thicket. 
Sophisticated case law as well adds to the high complexity of GmbH law. 
German courts have started an unparalleled development by establishing rules, 
under which agreed cash contributions may be treated as contributions in kind 
("verschleierte Sacheinlage", "concealed contribution in kind"). As will be shown, 
this case law leads to a perilous liability trap for GmbH shareholders. 
The fact pattern behind this liability trap may be illustrated by an example. 
A GmbH is formed. One of the shareholders contributes €100,000 in cash. Five 
months after the registration of the GmbH, the same shareholder sells various goods 
to the GmbH and receives €100,000 as consideration, which shall be assumed to be 
an adequate amount. A couple of years later, the GmbH becomes insolvent. A court 
appoints an insolvency administrator. On behalf of the GmbH, the insolvency 
administrator now confronts the shareholder with a claim amounting to €200,000. 
Taking into account German case law, the insolvency administrator's claim is 
likely to be successful. If there is a close coherence of a cash contribution and a later 
transaction between the contributing shareholder and the GmbH, German courts 
assume that the shareholder never truly intended to contribute cash, but in fact 
wanted to contribute the assets, which were the subject of the later transaction. 
With regard to the aforementioned example, courts would presume that the 
shareholder always wanted to contribute the goods and not the €100,000 cash. 
This assumption has three major consequences. First, the shareholder has paid 
the €100,000 without reason, as there was never an obligation to contribute cash. 
Therefore, the shareholder can reclaim this amount. However, he will probably 
receive little or no payment. As the GmbH is insolvent, the shareholder is just one 
creditor among many others. 
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Secondly, the transaction regarding the goods is held to be void. The courts 
assume that this transaction, though formally construed as a sales transaction, 
actually concerns the contribution of assets in exchange for shares. The GmbHG 
requires that all contributed assets have to be listed in the company's articles. 153 
Because such a listing is missing here, the transaction is void. Consequently, the 
GmbH may reclaim the purchase prize of €100,000, and the shareholder may reclaim 
the goods. However, as the goods are likely to be resold meanwhile, this claim is 
probably not successful. Thirdly, if a contribution agreement concerning assets other 
than cash is invalid, the shareholder is liable to contribute cash amounting to the 
worth of the assets. 154 As the shareholder wanted to contribute goods amounting to 
€100,000, he is liable for that amount. 
In the end, the shareholder has an obligation to pay €200,000, including 
€1 00,000 refund of the purchase prize, and €100,000 compensation for the invalid 
contribution agreement. His counterclaims (€100,000 and the goods) are likely to be 
frustrated, as the GmbH is insolvent and a set-off of mutual claims between 
shareholder and GmbH is generally not allowed under GmbH law. 155 
The objective of this case law is that courts want to prevent an evasion of 
contribution rules. As was shown above, GmbH contributions are governed by an 
overly restrictive set of rules. In particular the fact that the register court routinely 
asks for expert valuations if expensive assets are contributed, is a time-consuming 
and also costly burden. Thus, courts want to prevent a practice, where shareholder 
always contribute cash first, and later on transfer other assets to the company and 
receive as consideration the cash they have originally contributed. This case law is 
heavily criticised. 156 Indeed, Gennan courts have further complicated GmbH law and 
needlessly added to the strictness of GmbH law. The courts' objective to prevent 
shareholders from evading contribution rules is acceptable. However, as intentional 
behaviour is not a condition for the liability to occur, 157 courts have created a 
hazardous liability trap. 
153 S 5(IV) GmbHG. 
154 S 19(V) GmbHG. 
155 According to s l 9(II)(2) GmbHG, a shareholder cannot offset his contribution debt against a debt 
owed by the company. 
156 Guenther H Roth and Roiger Altrneppen GmbHG (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 5, para 69; Herbert 
Roth "Gruendungstheorie: Ist der Damm gebrochen?" ( 1999) 1999 ZIP 861, 863. 
157 Adolf Baumbach and Goetz Rueck GmbHG (17 ed, Beck, Munich, 2000) s 19, para 30a. 
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(c) Raising of capital 
The minimum share capital and the contribution rules are only the tip of the 
iceberg. Rules governing the raising of the capital further complicate the GmbH 
regime. The aspect of capital raising relates to all rules that govern the actual 
implementation of the agreed contributions. 
At the outset, GmbH shareholders and LLC members are liable for their 
contribution. 158 However, this liability has different dimensions. Whereas the LLC 
member is only liable for their own contribution, a GmbH shareholder may be liable 
for all contributions, in the worst case resulting in a liability amounting to the share 
capital figure. 159 For both GmbH and LLC it needs to be discussed whether it is 
possible to compromise the obligation to contribute. A GmbH contribution cannot be 
waived at all. 160 The only way to eliminate a contribution obligation is to reduce the 
share capital, which is a lengthy and complicated process. 161 In contrast, the LLC 
statute approves a waiver by consent of all members. 162 Besides all members 
consenting, such a compromise requires the articles of organisation to be amended 
accordingly. 163 With regard to third parties, it needs to be considered that such a 
waiver does not affect those creditor rights that have been established before the 
amendment of the articles. 
The previous remarks all concern initial contributions. However, both GmbH 
and LLC law also allow for contributions to be made subsequent to the formation. 
The LLC statute requires that in case of subsequent contributions the company's 
articles have to be amended accordingly. 164 The subsequent issue of GmbH shares 
also necessitates an amendment of the entity's articles. Such an amendment requires 
a shareholder resolution with a three-quarter majority, a notarisation of that 
resolution, and a notarised statement of the new shareholder(s). 165 
158 S 19(1) GmbHG, @17-15-12I(a)(ii) . 
159 See s 24 GmbHG. However, before this comprehensive liability is enforced, attempts must be 
made to sell the interest by public auction, see ss 21 et sqq GmbHG. 
160 Sees 19(II)(1) GmbHG. 
161 See ss 58 et sqq GmbHG. 
162 See @ l7-15-12l(c) . 
163 @ l 7-15-120(a)(iii). 
164 @17-15-129(b)(i). The original and one copy of the amendment must be filed to the Secretary of 
State, accompanied by a filing fee. An amendment is required at most once a year, @17-15-129( c ). 
165 Ss 53, 55(I) GmbHG. The resolution, the declaration and the complete (new) text of the company's 
articles have to be filed to the register court, s 4(1) GmbHG. 
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(d) Maintenance of capital 
The GmbHG is not only very intent on actually ra1smg the agreed 
contributions. It also provides strict rules to ensure that contributed assets 
continuously remain part of the company's estate. First, it has already been shown 
that contribution liabilities cannot be waived. 166 Furthermore, payments to 
shareholders are unlawful as long as the company's assets do not cover the share 
capital. 167 Therefore, GmbH contributions can generally not be returned. 168 
In contrast, LLC contributions can be returned. It only requires that all creditor 
claims could be satisfied at the time of return and all members' consent. 169 
Unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, the members' consent is not 
necessary if the claiming member has a right to get the contribution returned. Such a 
right exists if the company is dissolved or if the member gives a written notice 
regarding the claim six months in advance. 170 
(i) Bail out mechanism 
Consequently, an LLC member has a statutory right to claim the return of 
contribution as long as proper notice is given and creditor rights are not affected. 171 
This rule traces back to principles of partnership law. 172 It provides members with a 
bail out mechanism, which in practice is a cost-effective tool of dispute resolution. 
Conflicts between members are, therefore, not likely to put a continuous strain on the 
company, but may be easily solved by a member's dissociation. 
166 S I9(II)(l) GmbHG. 
167 Ss 30, 31 GmbHG. More details in part VB 6 (c) of this paper. 
t
68 A return of contributions can only be achieved by dissolving the company or decreasing the share 
capital. However, such a decrease of the share capital is a highly complicated process, which adheres 
to strict procedural mles, see ss 58 et sqq GmbHG. 
169 See@I7-15-120(a)(i). 
170 See @17-I5-120(b)(ii). The member is only entitled to receive cash, irrespectively of the kind and 
nature of assets originally contributed, @ 17-15-120(c). In Liebermann v Wyo111i11g.co111, LLC (2000) 
11 P 3d 353 (Wyo), the LLC terminated a member's positiot\ a vice-president. The member then 
asked for the return of contribution. The court held that the member was entitled to a return of 
contribution, but could not ask for dissolution and distribution of profits . 
171 However, even lawfully returned contributions may have to be payed back within six years if 
creditor claims need to be satisfied, @17-15-t2I(d). 
172 See s 601(a)(i) Uniform Partnership Act Wyo St Title 17 Chapter 21 (1977): "A partner is 
dissociated from a paitnership upon ... receipt by the partnership of notice of the partner's express will 
to withdraw as a pa1tner or upon any later date specified in the notice." 
TI1e US Limited Liability Compan y: A Role Model for German Company Law 36 
The GmbHG, in contrast, does not include such a mechanism. However, 
GmbH shareholders can generally sell and transfer their shares. 173 If the company has 
assets exceeding the amount of the share capital, the company may use those 
exceeding financial means for a buyback of those shares. 174 In very exceptional cases 
an undeniable right of shareholders to a return of contribution is acknowledged. 175 
However, this right exclusively concerns cases of extreme hardship, and it is only 
granted if the shareholder has failed to sell the shares beforehand. 176 
In conclusion, both LLC and GmbH law provide the possibility of a member's 
dissociation to resolve internal conflicts. However, methods differ remarkably. 
Whereas the LLC statute expressly grants a right to return of contribution, 
GmbH law rather puts a focus on the sale and transfer of shares. 
(ii) Shareholder loans 
GmbH legislation and German courts have extended the capital maintenance 
system and established highly complicated rules for shareholder loans that cause this 
area to be responsible for a great deal of litigation and academic controversy. 177 
The fact pattern behind all this is simple. If the GmbH 1s m a severe cns1s, the 
shareholders basically have two choices. They can dissolve the company or, 
alternatively, throw in new equity capital. Shareholders often do not want to dissolve, 
and neither do they want to throw in new equity capital because in case of insolvency 
the capital is likely to vanish completely. In regard to their contributions, 
shareholders have lowest priority and are paid out only after all other creditors have 
been satisfied. 178 Therefore, shareholders tend to choose a third option. They give 
loans to the company. If it later turns out that the crisis cannot be overcome, they 
hope to recover the loan money. Obviously, granting a loan instead of bringing in 
equity capital affects creditor rights, as creditors generally can only access the share 
capital and not the loan money. 
173 S 15(1) GmbHG. The transaction agreement needs to be notarised, s 15(III) GmbHG. Furthermore, 
the articles can restrict the transfer, particularly calling for the other shareholders' consent. 
In exceptional cases, the shareholders' consent cannot be refused; Guenther H Roth and Holger 
Altmeppen GmbHG (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 15, para 100. 
174 Sees 33(11) GmbHG. 
175 Guenther H Roth and Holger Altrneppen GmbHG ( 4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 60, para 101 . 
176 Guenther H Roth and Holger Altrneppen GmbHG (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 60, para 103. 
177 For a comprehensive overview see Markus C Stadler "Treatment of Shareholder Loans to 
Undercapitalized Corporations in Bankruptcy Proceedings" ( 1997) 17 J L & Com 1. 
178 Markus C Stadler "Treatment of Shareholder Loans to Undercapitalized Corporations m 
Bankrnptcy Proceedings" ( 1997) 17 J L & Com 1, 3. 
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Consequently, the issue becomes whether the loan was in reality a bona fide 
loan or a disguised contribution to the equity capital. In GmbH law, this situation is 
addressed both by case law and legislation. For many years, courts have developed 
circumstances, under which a shareholder loan, which is deemed to be more properly 
characterised as a capital contribution rather than as a loan, is actually treated as a 
contribution. 179 This case law has later on been put into statutory form. 180 
The respective provisions, however, only codify the case law to a certain extent, and 
provide a standard of protection that is lower than that established by the courts. 
The courts, therefore, not only apply the statutory provisions, but also resort to the 
principles as established prior to the codification. 181 
Similar to German law, US law also provides for rules governing shareholder 
loans, mainly comprising three different approaches: disallowance, equitable 
subordination, and recharacterisation of loans as equity rather than debt. 182 
These rules mainly apply in bankruptcy proceedings. However, equitable 
subordination may also be invoked outside the context of a bankruptcy. 
Shareholders need to be prevented from unfairly shifting the risks of business 
ownership to the creditors while retaining the benefits of ownership. However, 
German courts have carried that reasonable thought to excess. Not only is it overly 
complex to apply the "old" case law principles, though statutory provisions do exist. 
German courts have also extended the existing rules without any sense of proportion. 
For example, the application of the rules is not limited to loans. The rules may also 
be applied with regard to the assignment of property for usage. 183 A shareholder 
agreeing to let the GmbH use his property without any consideration may not be able 
179 Courts have based this case law on ss 30, 31 GmbHG analogue. 
180 See ss 32a, 32b GmbHG. These provisions only apply to shareholder loans, which were granted to 
the company not earlier than one year prior to the beginning of insolvency proceedings, see 
ss 135, 143 lnsolvenzordung (Insolvency Code), http:i/www.bundesrcgierung.de/-,41 8/Gesetze.htm 
(last accessed 25 September 2003). Outside this period, ss 32a, 32b GmbHG do not apply. 
18 1 In BGHZ 90, 370, the BGH had to deal with a shareholder loan that was granted outside the one-
year-period as required by ss 32a, 32b GmbHG. The BGH held that, outside the coverage of the 
statutory provisions, it is possible to resort to the previous case law principles. 
182 Markus C Stadler "Treatment of Shareholder Loans to Undercapitalized Corporations in 
Bankruptcy Proceedings" ( 1997) 17 J L & Com 1, 1. 
183 In BGH ( 1997) 1997 NJW 3026, a shareholder had rented factory premises to his GmbH. The 
GmbH got behind the rent payments and finally became insolvent. The issue was whether the 
shareholder could claim the outstanding rent and terminate the rental agreement. The BGH held that 
the extension for payment ( of the rent) is comparable to granting a loan and, therefore, can be treated 
as a capital contribution. As a result, the shareholder could not claim the outstanding rent and had to 
to !era te the further use of the premises. 
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to terminate such a usage agreement until the GmbH has finally overcome the crisis. 
Furthermore, the rules are also extended regarding the persons involved. 
For example, former shareholders or even relatives of shareholders might be 
incapable of asking for the return of a loan. 184 
Overall, the analysis of the capital structure has revealed apparent differences. 
The LLC is governed by a straightforward regime. It features no minimum share 
capital, but flexible contribution rules, and an appropriate bail out mechanism. 
In contrast, driven by the ambition to provide creditor protection, GmbH law 
establishes a restrictive and highly complicated set of rules. In principle justified 
instruments of creditor protection are carried to excess, thereby widely ignoring 
business interests. GmbH shareholders, therefore, run a relatively high risk of non-
compliance. This in fact lowers the attractiveness of the GmbH as a business form 
substantially, and underlines the need for company law reform in Germany. 
5 Management 
Capital rules have shown striking differences that result in a disadvantageous 
position of the GmbH. In the following, operational issues will be compared. 
Here, it is shown that in particular the flexibility as to the form of management 
significantly adds to the convenience of the LLC. 
(a) Centralised or decentralised management? 
Concerning management, the most eye-catching difference is that centralised 
management is mandatory only for the GmbH. The GmbHG requires the GmbH to 
have at least one manager. 185 In contrast, the LLC is generally member-managed; 
management is vested in the company's members in proportion to their capital 
contribution. 186 Though members may wish to vary the allocation ofrights and duties 
184 In BGH (1981) 1982 NJW 386, the son of a shareholder had granted a loan to his father 's GmbH. 
The BGH held that the son could not claim repayment of the loan money unless the company 's crisis 
is overcome or all other creditors are satisfied. 
185 S 6(1) GmbHG. The management is appointed in the articles or elected later on. It can be removed 
at any time. For details sees 38 GmbHG. Changes in the management have to be filed immediately to 
the register court, s 39 GmbHG. S 15 HGB provides a sophisticated system protecting third parties; as 
long as the change is not registered, third parties can rely upon the old status. 
186 @ 17-15-116. 
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m a management agreement, the default mles of the LLC statute are overall 
appropriate and especially beneficial for small and medium-sized businesses. These 
businesses are often member-managed and can, under LLC law, avoid the formalities 
of centralised management, for instance the appointment process. Consequently, the 
combination of direct control and limited liability presents clear advantages over 
either the corporate or the partnership form for a wide range of business firms. 
(b) Authority issues 
When looking at authority provisions, differences become obvious in regard 
to possible restrictions. The GmbH is exclusively represented by its managers. 187 
Any restriction to their authority has no effect on third parties. 188 In the case of a 
single-person-GmbH, the only shareholder can generally not conclude legal 
transactions between the GmbH and himself, if he is also the only manager. 189 
Regarding the LLC, each manager or - if the LLC is member-managed - each 
member can contract for a debt of the LLC. 190 In contrast to GmbH law, both the 
managers' and the members' authority can be restricted internally but also 
extemally. 191 It needs also to be considered that the ultra vires doctrine applies, 
restricting the authority to the company's business. 192 
In conclusion, the GmbH mles only allow for internal restrictions and, 
thereby, protect third parties doing business with the GmbH. In contrast, the LLC 
provisions also tolerate restrictions with external effect and, therefore, give members 
the opportunity to protect the company's assets against undesirable transactions by 
managers and members. 
187 S 35(1) GmbHG. The management can delegate by appointing agents or giving procuration; 
Guenther H Roth and Bolger Altmeppen GrnbHG (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 35, para 10. 
188 S 38(II) GmbHG. While the transaction is valid, the manager acting in contravention of the 
restriction is liable to the GmbH, s 43 GmbHG. Therefore, internal restriction is possible. 
189 Ss 35(IV) GmbHG, 181 BGB. This rule is designed to prevent conflicts of interest. However, it is 
rather a formality because it is a default rule, s 35(IV) GmbHG. Articles of single-person GmbHs, 
therefore, routinely exclude the application of this mle. 
190 @ 17-15-117. Besides the LLC statute, general agency principles apply. For example, in 
Water, Waste & land v Lanham ( 1998) 955 P2d 997 (Colo Supr C), the court held that the LLC as 
principal must be disclosed at any time. 
191 The external effect is not expressly addressed in the Wyoming LLC statute. Section 301 ULLCA 
provides that the company is generally bound (externally), unless the contracting manager or member 
had no authority to act and the contracting partner knew of the lack of authority. 
192 See detailed remarks in part VB I of this paper. 
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In has been shown that the operational flexibility adds to the convenience of 
the LLC. Governance rights and authority are generally vested in the members. 
However, by appointing managers, LLC members can also adopt a management 
structure resembling features of corporations. 193 This "chameleon management" 
structure 194 means that there is flexibility to choose between decentralised and 
centralised management. This makes the LLC attractive. By using decentralised 
management, members can combine direct control and limited liability. 
6 Member-related issues 
Up to this point, an easier entity formation, flexible capital rules and a choice 
as to the structure of management have proven to be the most apparent advantages of 
the LLC form. In the following, some member-related issues further illustrate the 
benefits of the LLC. In particular this includes diverging approaches regarding 
fiduciary duties as an instrument of minority protection. 
(a) Shares and their transferability 
When looking at company shares and their transferability, it first appears that 
in this regard GmbH law is more convenient. Both GmbH shareholders and LLC 
members receive shares corresponding to the value of their contributions. 195 
These shares can generally be transferred. A transfer of GmbH shares needs not to be 
approved by other shareholders. However, the transaction agreement has to be 
notarised. 196 In contrast, for the transfer of LLC shares all members have to give their 
consent. If that consent is lacking, the transferee does not become a member and can 
only enjoy financial rewards. 197 In conclusion, GmbH shares are established as 
tradeable papers, whereas the LLC statute sticks to partnership principles making the 
transfer rather difficult. 198 
193 Robert W Hamilton Cases and Materials on Corporations Including Partnerships and limited 
liability Companies (7 ed, St Paul , Minnessota, 200 I) I 90. 
194 
Larry E Ribsteirt "The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company" (1995) 51 Bus Law 1. 
t
95 While the shares cannot be listed on the stock exchange, LLC shares nught be considered as 
security for the Securities Act 1933 and the Exchange Act 1934; In the affirmative Nutek Information 
Systems v Arizona Corporation Commission (1998) 977 P 2d 826 (Ariz App); denying Great lakes v 
Monsanto Company (2000) 96 F Supp 2d 376 (Del). 
196 Sees IS(III) GmbHG. 
197 @17-15-122. 
198 However, GmbH shares are not as tractable as shares of a public corporation. 
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Nevertheless, both the GmbH and the LLC rules are only default rules. 199 
Consequently, GmbH shareholders can agree on a more partnership-like transfer 
regime, whereas LLC members may decide for a more corporate-like system. 
Apparently, the GmbH default rules are rather appropriate for larger companies that 
are characterised by a more frequent fluctuation of shareholders and, therefore, need 
easily transferable shares. In contrast, the LLC default rules are appropriate for 
smaller companies. Here, members generally have a more personal bonding and, 
therefore, need a certain level of protection against the intrusion of new, possibly 
unwanted members. Consequently, restrictive transfer rules tend to be more suitable 
for small, particularly family businesses. 
(b) Meetings and voting 
Whereas the LLC statute does not provide any prov1s1ons concemmg 
meetings and voting, the GmbH is subject to an extensive mandatory regime.200 
Meetings are generally called by the management.201 Holders of at least 10 per cent 
of the shares may also be able to call a meeting. 202 A meeting notice has to be given 
at least one week in advance by registered mail.203 At the meeting, the general rule is 
majority voting.204 However, some voting needs a three-quarter majority or must 
even be unanimous.205 Votes can be delivered in person or - if all shareholders 
consent - in writing.206 Finally, it has to be noted that shareholders, who have been 
outvoted, can take legal action against the respective resolution.207 Obviously, these 
restrictive rules are not appropriate for small and informal companies. Considering 
that the rules are not default rules but mandatory rules, particularly family businesses 
and single-person entities are forced under a formalistic and burdensome regime. 
199 Pursuant to s l 5(V) GmbHG, the articles can draw up further restrictions, particularly requiring the 
afoproval of the company or all other shareholders. For the LLC see @ l 7- l 5- l 44(b ). 
2 0 Ss 47 to 51 GmbHG (406 words). 
201 The management has the duty to call a meeting if that is in the company's interest or if there has 
been a loss amounting to half of the share capital, sees 49 GmbHG. 
202 S 50 GmbHG. 
203 S 51(1) GmbHG. 
204 S 47(1) GmbHG . 
205 See for examples 53 (II)(l) GmbHG. 
206 S 48(II) GmbHG. 
207 See ss 241 AktG analogue. 
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( c) Profit distribution 
Both GmbH shareholders and LLC members are entitled to the profits.208 
As a default rule, profits are generally allocated on the basis of the value of the paid-
up contributions.209 Nevertheless, there are various constraints on the allocation of 
dividends both under LLC and GmbH law. Most importantly, LLC profits can only 
be distributed if the company's assets are in excess of all the entity's liabilities.210 
Similarly, GmbH profits may only be distributed if the company's assets are in 
excess of the GmbH's liabilities and, moreover, exceed the share capital figure as 
stated in the articles. 211 
However, GmbH and LLC form differ in so far as the procedure of profit 
distribution is concerned. Whereas under LLC law the actual distribution process is 
left to the members' discretion in the operating agreement, GmbH law provides for a 
comprehensive set of mandatory rules. For any profits to be distributed, 
two shareholder resolutions are necessary. A first resolution has to confirm the 
annual statement of account. A second resolution then has to determine the actual 
amount that is to be distributed as dividends.212 These formalities may constrain the 
timing of profit distribution to GmbH shareholders. 
A further aspect is whether a dividend may be charged against share capital. 
This is possible under LLC law. 213 With regard to GmbH law, it is essential to make 
the following distinction. Shareholders cannot charge profit claims against their 
original contribution obligation.214 However, if the share capital figure is increased 
later on, it is possible to contribute existing profit claims in exchange for new shares. 
It is only required that the resolution, which is necessary to increase the share capital, 
clearly states that profit claims are being contributed. 21 5 
208 S 29(1) GmbHG;@ l7-15-l 19. 
209 S 29(1) GmbHG; @17-15-119. 
210 @17-15-119, 
211 Ss 30, 31 GmbHG. 
212 In most cases, not all of the company's net profits are distributed. Profits can also be allocated to 
reserves and not distributed. However, there are various restrictions, sees 58b GmbHG. 
2 13 See @17-15-119: "The ... company may ... divide and allocate the profits ... among the members; 
provided, that . . . the assets of the limited liability company are in excess of all liabilities of the limited 
liability company except liabilities to members on account of their contributions." 
214 Sees 19(II)(2) GmbHG. 
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( d) Fiduciary duties 
Finally, differences become apparent when looking at minority protection. 
It has already been mentioned that LLC law provides a very cost-effective bail out 
mechanism, which serves as an effective tool for dispute resolution and, therefore, as 
an instrument for minority protection.216 As shown, the GmbHG does not include 
such a mechanism, but generally allows for an unproblematic transfer of shares.217 
Besides that, minority protection measures exist both for GmbH and LLC. 
Among those measures are, for instance, derivative actions (actio pro socio),218 
information rights,219 and fiduciary duties. 220 The following part takes a closer look 
at fiduciary duties only, and limits the analysis to duties owed by members and 
shareholders to each other and to their company. 221 The analysis of fiduciary duties 
owed by LLC members and GmbH shareholders illustrates that LLC law provides a 
more flexible approach, whereas GmbH law introduces a highly sophisticated system 
and, thereby, in particular burdens small and informal businesses.222 
2 15 Adolf Baumbach and Goetz Hueck GmbHG (17 ed, Beck, Munich, 2000) s 5, para 28. 
216 @ l 7-15-120(b)(ii). See part IV B 4 (d) (i) ofthis paper. 
217 See part IV B 4 ( d) ( i) of this paper. 
218 In GmbH law, this is an unwritten principle, Guenther H Roth and Bolger Altmeppen GmbHG 
(4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 13, para 48; for the LLC, see @ 17-15-130. 
219 For the GmbH, see s 51a GmbHG. The Wyoming LLC statute does not expressly refer to 
members' information rights; however, such a right is generally acknowledged; see s 408 ULLCA; 
in Somerville's Trust v US V Partners, LLC (2 August 2002) Lexis 103 (Del Ch), the court 
acknowledged a member's right to inspect company books and records. 
220 For the GmbH, Guenther H Roth and Bolger Altmeppen GmbHG (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 13, 
para 61; for the LLC, see s 103 ULCCA. 
22 1 Nevertheless, also managers that are not members or shareholders owe fiduciary duties to the 
company. These duties are not discussed here, as this part deals with minority protection, meaning 
with instruments that help to protect interests of minority members and shareholders. 
222 The area of fiduciary duties is highly contentious. "A majority of the contested issues in business 
law scholarship today relates to fiduciary duties", Paula J Dalley "To Whom It May Concern: 
Fiduciary Duties and Business Associations" (2001) 26 Del J Corp L 515, 516; "Most legal 
scholarship has examined the potential liability and the scope of the fiduciary duty of the members of 
an LLC", Leigh A Bacon "Note: "Freedom of' Or "Freedom From"? The Enforceability Of Contracts 
And The Integrity Of The LLC" (2001) 50 Duke L J 1087. For a general overview see William H 
Copperthwaite Jr "Limited Liability Companies: The Choice for the Future" (1998) 103 Com L J 222, 
236; David L Cohen "Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should 
Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities 
Regulation for the Limited Liability Company?" (1998) 51 Okla L Rev 427; Richard A Booth 
"Fiduciary Duty, Contract, and Waiver in Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies" (1997) 1 J 
Small & Emerging Bus L 55, 55; Claire Moore Dickerson "Equilibrium Destabilized: Fiduciary 
Duties Under the Uni form Limited Liability Company Act" ( 1995) 25 Stetson L Rev 417. 
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Both the GmbHG and the Wyoming LLC statute do not expressly address 
fiduciary duties of shareholders and members. However, the existence of such duties 
is commonly accepted.223 The extent and specification of fiduciary duties is 
multifaceted. Obviously, in a small company members and shareholders are more 
personally involved, whereas in large companies shareholding is mostly a capital 
investment. Therefore, fiduciary duties are claimed to be more intense in small 
companies that feature rather personalistic instead of capitalistic elements. 224 
Fiduciary duties relate to very different issues. A few examples may illustrate 
the scope of such duties. For the GmbH it was decided that the refusal to vote for a 
necessary amendment of the articles is a breach of fiduciary duties.225 
Both GmbH and LLC law know the corporate opportunity doctrine, whereupon 
fiduciary duties are breached when a shareholder or member seizes economic 
opportunities from the company for personal benefits.226 With regard to the LLC, 
the court in Stephen A Cole v Kenneth A Kershaw et al held that the elimination of a 
minority owner by a majority owner without compensation was a breach of fiduciary 
duties. 22 7 In Palmer v Moffat et al, some members withheld capital contributions, and 
as a result the company defaulted on its finance obligations. This behaviour was held 
to be a breach of fiduciary duties as well. 228 
223 For the GmbH, Guenther H Roth and Holger Altmeppen GmbHG (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 13, 
para 61; however, some scholars still oppose the existence of such duties, Werner Flume 
"Die Rechtsprechung des II . Zivilsenats des BGH zur Treupflicht des GmbH-Gesellschafters und des 
Aktionars" (1996) 1996 ZIP 161. For the LLC, see Taurus Adviso,y Group, Inc et al v Sector 
Management, Inc et al (15 April 1998) WL 199353 (Conn Super). As part of the obiter dicta, the court 
held that also between members of an LLC fiduciary duties do exist. In Walker et al v Virtual 
Packaging LLC et al (1997) 493 SE 2d 551 (Ga App), it was held that in case ofa breach of fiduciary 
duties the aggrieved member is able to claim damages resulting from the breach. 
224 Guenther H Roth and Holger Altmeppen GmbHG (4 ed, Beck, Munich, 2003) s 13, para 64. 
225 In BGH (1995) 1995 NJW 1739, the share capital had to be decreased to achieve the company's 
recapitalisation. For such a decrease, the articles of organisation need to be amended. The court held, 
that the refusal to vote for such a necessary amendment breached fiduciary duties. 
226 In BGH (1989) 1989 ZIP 986, a shareholder used one of the company 's inventions/patents to make 
personal profits, This was held to be a breach of fiduciary duties, In US West, Inc et al v Tim e Warner 
Inc (6 June 1996) WL 307445 (Del Ch) the court held that the corporate opportunity doctrine also 
applies outside the corporate context, meaning to LLCs and even to partnerships. 
22 7 Stephen A Cole v Kenneth A Kershaw et al (30 November 2001) Lexis 43 (Del Ch). 
The defendants merged the original entity into a new entity that was owned by all former participants 
except the plaintiff. The court held that the majority owner had no power to remove the minority 
owner and to forfeit his membership interest. 
228 Palmer v Moffat et al (10 October 2001) Lexis 386 (Del Super). 
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Businesses do not have to worry too much about the existence and extent of 
fiduciary duties as long as those duties can be defined, restricted or even excluded by 
agreement. In this regard, GmbH law is very restrictive. Courts are very reluctant to 
accept a restriction of fiduciary duties in the articles or in a side agreement.229 
Scholars predominantly even support the view that fiduciary duties are mandatory.230 
For the LLC, the situation 1s different. Though the ULLCA restricts the 
party's freedom to dispose of fiduciary duties,231 most LLC statutes allow a great 
deal of party autonomy. Some of the states do not mention fiduciary duties in their 
LLC statutes, but expressly allow defining duties of members and managers in the 
operating agreement. 232 Other states include default provisions in their statutes, 
allowing the parties to modify these duties, though setting a minimum standard under 
which the duty may not fall. 233 Finally, other states regard fiduciary duties as an 
element of contract and allow members to opt-out of fiduciary duties completely. 234 
Admittedly, the approach of American States is not consistent. However, overall 
most LLC statutes feature a very flexible approach to fiduciary duties. 
The courts mainly acknowledge this flexibility. Whereas courts still tend not 
to permit a waiver of fiduciary duties in partnership agreements,235 this seems to be 
different for the LLC. In ELF Atochem North America, Inc v Cyrus A Jajfari and 
Malek LLC, the court held that a reduction or exclusion is possible as long as only 
229 In BGH (1995) 1995 NJW 194, the court held that fiduciary duties as to informing minority 
shareholders about important company transactions can only be restricted if there are strong reasons . 
Here, the admissible business competition of a shareholder was held to be not a sufficient reason. 
23° Christian Hartmann "Der Schutz der GmbH vor ihren Gesellschaftern" ( 1999) 1999 GmbHR 1061. 
231 Sees 103(b)(2), (3), (4) ULLCA. 
232 Ariz Rev Stat Ann. 29-682 (West 1998); Nev Rev Stat Ann 86 281(9) (Michie 1999); Utah Code 
Ann 48-2b-126 (Supp 1998). These provisions all state that duties of members and managers are 
subject to the operating agreement. 
233 Ill Comp Stat Ann 180/15-5(b)(6)(A) provides that the operating agreement can define types or 
categories of activities that do not violate fiduciary duties, unless being "manifestly unreasonable." 
234 See s 18-1 I O 1 ( c )(2) Del LLC Act: "Member's or manager's or other person's duties and liabilities 
may be expanded or restricted by provisions in the limited liability company agreement." 
235 In Wartski v Bedford (1991) 926 F 2d 11 (1st Cir), a partner took advantage of a company 
opportunity for his personal profit. The court held that this was a breach of fiduciary duties and 
awarded damages. The court stated that the fiduciary duty of partners are an integral part of the 
partnership agreement whether or not expressly set forth therein. They cannot be negated by the words 
of the partnership agreement. 
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member rights are touched, not rights of third parties.236 In McConnell v Hunt Sports 
Enterprises, the court even held that members could simply limit the scope of their 
fiduciary duties by negotiating them out of the operating agreement of the LLC.237 
This issue is highly contentious among legal scholars. Some scholars allow 
members to opt-out of fiduciary duties by arguing that such duties are a purely 
contractual matter. 238 It is further argued that LLC members can be better controlled 
by incorporating specific contract terms rather than having fiduciary duties. 239 
Other scholars argue that fiduciary duties are not waivable. 240 However, in the end it 
should be apparent that a waiver is possible. LLCs are intended to be flexible 
organisations that allow members to negotiate the terms of their relationships with 
themselves and the company.241 This is in particularly helpful for small businesses in 
need of an informal operation of the company. 
Besides an easier entity formation, flexible capital rules, and a choice as to 
the form of management, member-related issues further underline the attractiveness 
of the LLC. It has been shown that in particular a flexible approach regarding 
fiduciary duties facilitates a smooth functioning of the business. 
236 ELF Atochem North America, Inc v Cyrus A Jaffari and Malek LLC (1999) 727 A 2d 286, 292 
(Del); discussing this decision Robert W Hamilton Cases and Materials on Corporations Including 
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies (7 ed, St Paul, Minnesota, 2001) 197 et sqq). 
237 McConnell v Hunt Sports Enterprises (1999) 725 NE 2d 1193 (Ohio Ct App); see the case note of 
Tammy Savidge Moore "The Policy of Opting-Out of Fiduciary Duties in a Limited Liability 
Company: McConnell v Hunt Sport Enterprises (1999) 725 NE 2d 1193 (Ohio Ct App)" (2000) 
42 S Tex L Rev 183. 
238 Larry E Ribstein ,,Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms" (1997) 54 Wash & Lee L 
Rev 537, 539; Terence Woolf"The Venture Capitalist 's Corporate Opportunity Problem" (2001) 2001 
Colum Bus L Rev 473, 500, 50 I. The authors of these articles do not draw a distinction between 
closely held (family) businesses and larger firms . 
239 Larry E Ribstein ,,Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms" (1997) 54 Wash & Lee L 
Rev 537, 543. 
240 Tammy Savidge Moore "The Policy of Opting-Out of Fiduciary Duties in a Limited Liability 
Company: McConnell v Hunt Sport Enterprises (1999) 725 NE 2d 1193 (Ohio Ct App)" (2000) 42 S 
Tex L Rev 183, 206; Melvin Aron Eisenberg ,,The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract" 
(1995) 47 Stan L Rev 211,249. 
24 1 Stan Johnson "Duties Under the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act: Analysis of a 
Statutory Conflict" (2002) 2002 Utah L Rev 551 , 554. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that an LLC-like business form is missing in the current 
menu of German company law. For small and medium-sized businesses that strive 
for limited liability, the German law basically only provides the GmbH. 
As illustrated in this paper, GmbH law tends to be excessively restrictive and, 
therefore, the GmbH is often inconvenient for informal small and medium firms. 
The restrictive character of GmbH law is due to the fact that legislation has 
been focusing on creditor protection. However, it has been pointed out that business 
interests have often not been thoroughly considered, and even the goal of creditor 
protection has not been attained in many cases. Therefore, it is not advisable to retain 
the status quo. Small and medium businesses should not be limited to the GmbH or 
partnership forms, but be offered an alternative, more convenient choice. 
In this regard, the LLC may well serve as a role model for German reform. 
It has been shown that various issues contribute to the attractiveness of the LLC. 
On the whole, the formation process requires less administrative efforts. LLC law is 
further characterised by flexible capital rnles. Moreover, decentralised management 
is possible, offering the opportunity to combine direct control and limited liability. 
Finally, fiduciary duties as an instrnment of minority protection are more or less 
disposable, providing more flexibility to business owners. Overall, LLC law is 
attractive because it is possible to shape an entity that is characterised by a 
combination of partnership and corporate elements, all selected to best suit the 
individual business. 
It may be argued that company reform should be rather advanced at a 
European level instead of seeking for a national solution. Not only large companies, 
but also small and medium-sized businesses increasingly exceed national boundaries 
and engage in cross-border trade. And indeed, company law has always been an area 
oflaw heavily influenced by European legislation. 242 
242 In 1985, the Regulation on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) created a new type 
of cooperation, which enables separate businesses from different Member States to develop certain 
joint activities without having to merge or to set up a jointly owned subsidiary: Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2137/85 of25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) OJ L 124, 
15/05/1990, 52. In late 2004, the Regulation on the Statute for a European company will come into 
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However, European legislation is likely to take many years to draft. German 
businesses urgently need a more flexible and convenient business fom1. Therefore, 
Gemrnny should take the lead and implement a new LLC-like business form. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: State Comparison Chart (US LLCs) 
State LLCLaw Enacted Type 
Alabama Yes 1993 Flexible 
Alaska Yes 1994 Flexible 
Arizona Yes 1993 Flexible 
Arkansas Yes 1993 Flexible 
California Yes 1994 Flexible 
Colorado Yes 1990 Flexible 
Connecticut Yes 1993 Flexible 
Delaware Yes 1992 Flexible 
Florida Yes 1982 Flexible 
Georgia Yes 1994 Flexible 
Hawaii Yes 1997 Flexible 
Idaho Yes 1993 Flexible 
Illinois Yes 1994 Flexible 
Indiana Yes 1993 Flexible 
Iowa Yes 1992 Flexible 
Kansas Yes 1990 Flexible 
Kentucky Yes 1994 Flexible 
Louisiana Yes 1992 Flexible 
Fee Tax 
$40.00 None 
$250.00 $200 
$50.00 None 
$50.00 None 
$70.00 $800+add 
$50.00 None 
$60.00 None 
$70.00 $100.00 
$125.00 None 
$75.00 5%wthhold 
$100 None 
$100.00 None 
$500.00 None 
$90.00 None 
$50.00 None 
$150.00 Formula 
$40.00 None 
$60.00 None 
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Maine Yes 1994 Flexible $250+105 None 
Maryland Yes 1992 Flexible $50.00 5%wthhold 
Massachus. Yes 1995 Flexible $500.00 $500.00 
Michigan Yes 1993 Flexible $50.00 None 
Minnesota Yes 1993 Flexible $135.00 None 
Mississippi Yes 1994 Flexible $50.00 None 
Missouri Yes 1993 Flexible $100.00 None 
Montana Yes 1993 Flexible $50.00 None 
Nebraska Yes 1993 Flexible $100.00 $43min 
Nevada Yes 1993 Flexible $125.00 None 
New Hamp. Yes 1993 Flexible $85.00 None 
New Jersey Yes NIA Flexible $100.00 None 
New Mexico Yes 1993 Flexible $50.00 None 
New York Yes 1994 Flexible $200.00 GrsRcptTx 
North Carol. Yes 1993 Flexible $125.00 None 
North Dako. Yes 1993 Flexible $125.00 None 
Ohio Yes 1994 Flexible $85.00 None 
Oklahoma Yes 1992 Flexible $100.00 None 
Oregon Yes 1994 Flexible $40.00 None 
Pennsylvania Yes 1995 Flexible NIA $300ann 
Rhode Island Yes 1992 Flexible $150.00 None 
South Carol. Yes 1994 Flexible $135.00 None 
South Dako. Yes 1993 Flexible $50min $50ann 
Tennessee Yes 1994 Flexible $300min $300min 
Texas Yes 1991 Flexible $200.00 Formula 
Utah Yes 1991 Flexible $50.00 None 
Vermont Yes 1996 Flexible $70.00 None 
Virginia Yes 1991 Flexible $100.00 None 
Washington Yes 1994 Flexible $175.00 None 
West Virgin. Yes 1992 Flexible NIA NIA 
Wisconsin Yes NIA Flexible $130.00 None 
Wyoming Yes 1977 Flexible $100.00 $100ann 
Washington Yes 1994 Flexible NIA $50.00 
Ava!lable at b.J.lp ~ "" . lie web.mm (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
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Appendix 2: Entity Comparison Chart (US Company Law) 
Characteristic Sole General Limited C Corp. S Corp. LLC 
Prop. Part. Part. 
Limited liability for No No No Yes Yes Yes 
all owners 
Owners can partici- NIA NIA No Yes Yes Yes 
pate in management 
without losing liability 
protection 
Easy to form and no Yes Yes No No No Yes 
need to keep extensive 
records 
Number of owners One Two or One to Two or One to One or 
more 35 more 75 more 
Restrictions on No No Yes No Yes No 
ownership 
Double taxation No No No Yes No No 
Able to deduct Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
business loss on 
individual return 
Able to add any NIA Yes No Yes No Yes 
number of additional 
investors including 
other entities 
Flexible distribution NIA Yes Yes No No Yes 
of profits and losses 
Available at h!l 1:/iwww.llcwcb.com (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
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